OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
BUNKLEY
v. FLORIDA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
FLORIDA
No. 02-8636. Decided May 27, 2003
Petitioner Bunkley had a pocketknife with a
21h- to 3-inch blade in his pocket when he was
arrested as he left an unoccupied restaurant. He was charged with
first-degree burglary because his knife was classified as a
"dangerous weapon" under Florida law, was convicted, and was
sentenced to life in prison. Had the pocketknife not been so
classified, his sentence could have been no more than five years.
His conviction became final in 1989. Florida has exempted the
"common pocketknife" from its weapons statute since 1901, and the
relevant language has remained unchanged. In 1997, in a separate
case, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the
"common pocketknife" exception for the first time, including a
pocketknife with a 3%-inch blade within the exception.
L. B.
v.
State, 700 So. 2d 370, 373. Bunkley then moved for state
postconviction relief, alleging that his armed robbery conviction
was invalid under
L. B. because his pocketknife was shorter
than 3% inches and could not therefore support a conviction
involving weapon possession. The Circuit Court denied his motion,
and the State District Court of Appeal affirmed. The State Supreme
Court rejected Bunkley's claim, holding that
L. B. was an
evolutionary refinement in the law that did not apply
retroactively.
Held: The Florida Supreme Court erred in failing to
determine whether the "common pocketknife" exception encompassed
Bunkley's pocketknife at the time his conviction became final. The
result here is controlled by
Fiore v.
White, 531 U. S. 225, which
involved a Pennsylvania criminal statute that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court interpreted for the first time after Fiore's
conviction had already become final. Under that interpretation,
Fiore's conduct did not violate an element of the statute. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reply to this Court's certified
question-that its interpretation merely clarified the statute's
plain language-revealed that Fiore's conviction violated due
process, because a State cannot convict a person without proving
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Application of
Fiore's due process principles may render a retroactivity
analysis unnecessary here.
Fiore requires the Florida
Supreme Court to answer whether, in light of
L. B.,
Bunkley's 2Y2- to 3-inch pocketknife fit within the state statute's
"common pocketknife" exception at the time his conviction became
final.
836
Per Curiam
Because the
L. B. decision cast doubt on the validity of
Bunkley's conviction by interpreting the exception to cover his
weapon,
Fiore entitles Bunkley to a determination whether
L. B. correctly stated the law as it stood at the time
Bunkley was convicted. The Florida Supreme Court characterized
L. B. as part of a century-long evolutionary process, but
did not decide what stage the law had reached by 1989. The proper
question for purposes of
Fiore is not just whether the law
changed, but when it changed. Unless and until the State Supreme
Court clarifies the exception's content in 1989, this Court cannot
know whether Bunkley's conviction violates the due process
principles set forth in
Fiore.
Certiorari granted; 833 So. 2d 739, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Clyde Timothy Bunkley petitions for a writ of certiorari,
arguing that the Florida Supreme Court contradicted the principles
of this Court's decision in
Fiore v.
White, 531 U. S.
225 (2001)
(per curiam), when it failed to determine whether
the "common pocketknife" exception to Florida's definition of a
"'[w]eapon'" encompassed Bunkley's pocketknife at the time that his
conviction became final in 1989. Fla. Stat. § 790.001(13) (2000).
We agree, and therefore grant Bunkley's motion to proceed
in
forma pauperis and his petition for a writ of certiorari.
I
In the early morning hours of April 16, 1986, Bunkley
burglarized a closed, unoccupied Western Sizzlin' Restaurant.
Report and Recommendation in No. 91-113-CIV-T-99(B) (MD Fla.), p.
1. The police arrested him after he left the restaurant. At the
time of his arrest, the police discovered a "pocketknife, with a
blade of 2lf2 to 3 inches in length, ... folded and in his pocket."
768 So. 2d 510 (Fla. App. 2000)
(per curiam). "There is no
evidence indicating Bunkley ever used the pocketknife during the
burglary, nor that he threatened anyone with the pocketknife at any
time."
Ibid.
Bunkley was charged with burglary in the first degree because he
was armed with a "dangerous weapon"-namely, the pocketknife. Fla.
Stat. § 810.02(2)(b) (2000). The punishment for burglary in the
first degree is "imprisonment
837
for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." §
810.02(2). If the pocketknife had not been classified as a
"dangerous weapon," Bunkley would have been charged with burglary
in the third degree. See 833 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. 2002). Burglary
in the third degree is punishable "by a term of imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years." Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d) (2002); see also 833
So. 2d, at 742. Bunkley was convicted of burglary in the first
degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1989, a Florida
appellate court affirmed Bunkley's conviction and sentence. See 539
So. 2d 477.
Florida law defines a "'[w]eapon'" to "mea[n] any dirk, metallic
knuckles, slingshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or
device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common
pocketknife." § 790.001(13). Florida has excepted the" 'common
pocketknife'" from its weapons statute since 1901, and the relevant
language has remained unchanged since that time. See 833 So. 2d, at
743.
In 1997, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of
the "common pocketknife" exception for the first time. In
L.
B. v.
State, 700 So. 2d 370, 373
(per curiam),
the court determined that a pocketknife with a blade of 3% inches
"plainly falls within the statutory exception to the definition of
'weapon' found in section 790.001(13)." The complete analysis of
the Florida Supreme Court on this issue was as follows: "In 1951,
the Attorney General of Florida opined that a pocketknife with a
blade of four inches in length or less was a 'common pocketknife.'
The knife appellant carried, which had a 3%-inch blade, clearly
fell within this range."
Ibid. (citation omitted). The
Florida Supreme Court accordingly vacated the conviction in
L.
B. because the "knife in question was a 'common pocketknife'
under any intended definition of that term."
Ibid. Justice
Grimes, joined by Justice Wells, wrote an opinion agreeing with the
majority's resolution of the case "[i]n view of the Attorney
General's opinion and the absence of a more definitive description
of a common pocketknife."
Ibid.
838
Per Curiam
After the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in
L.
B., Bunkley filed a motion for postconviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (1999). Bunkley alleged
that under the
L. B. decision, his pocketknife could not
have been considered a "weapon" under § 790.001(13). He therefore
argued that his conviction for armed burglary was invalid and
should be vacated because a "common pocketknife can not
[sic] support a conviction involving possession of a
weapon." App. to Pet. for Cert.
C-2. The Circuit Court
rejected Bunkley's motion, and the District Court of Appeal of
Florida, Second District, affirmed. 768 So. 2d 510 (2000).
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected Bunkley's claim.
It held that the
L. B. decision did not apply
retroactively. Under Florida law, only "jurisprudential upheavals"
will be applied retroactively. 833 So. 2d, at 743 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court stated that a "jurisprudential
upheaval is a
major constitutional change of law."
Id., at 745 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast,
any "evolutionary refinements" in the law "are not applied
retroactively."
Id., at 744. The court then held that
L.
B. was an evolutionary refinement in the law, and therefore
Bunkley was not entitled to relief. In a footnote, the Florida
Supreme Court cited our decision in
Fiore v.
White,
supra, and held without analysis that
Fiore did not
apply to this case. See 833 So. 2d, at 744, n. 12. *
*The dissent claims that the Florida Supreme Court did not need
to decide anything other than whether
L. B. was a change in
the law. See
post, at 845 (citing Fla. Rule Crim. Proc.
3.850(b)(2) (2000)). Yet as the dissent concedes, see
post,
at 843, the Florida Supreme Court passed upon the
Fiore due
process inquiry as well as the retroactivity question. The dissent
also notes that Bunkley has raised the issue of the common
pocketknife in prior appeals. These appeals, however, were filed
prior to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in
L. B.
And we agree with the dissent that absent the
L. B.
decision, Bunkley would not be able to pursue his claim now. The
Florida Supreme Court committed an error of law here by not
addressing whether the
L. B. decision means that at the time
Bunk-
839
Justice Pariente, joined by Chief Justice Anstead, dissented.
She stated that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
L.
B. "should be applied to grant Bunkley collateral relief." 833
So. 2d, at 746. She criticized the majority opinion for relying
solely on a retroactivity question. In her view, "application of
the due process principles of
Fiore renders a retroactivity
analysis ... unnecessary."
Id., at 747. She noted that even
if
L. B. was merely an evolutionary refinement of the law,
"the majority offers no precedent laying out the stages of this
evolution." 833 So. 2d, at 747. Because she thought the
L.
B. decision "correctly stated the law at the time Bunkley's
conviction became final," she would have vacated Bunkley's
conviction. 833 So. 2d, at 747.
II
Fiore v.
White involved a Pennsylvania criminal
statute that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted for the
first time after the defendant Fiore's conviction became final. See
531 U. S., at 226. Under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
interpretation of the criminal statute, Fiore could not have been
guilty of the crime for which he was convicted. See
id., at
227-228. We originally granted certiorari in
Fiore to
consider "when, or whether, the Federal Due Process Clause requires
a State to apply a new interpretation of a state criminal statute
retroactively to cases on collateral review."
Id., at 226.
"Because we were uncertain whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision ... represented a change in the law," we certified a
question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Id., at 228.
This question asked whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
interpretation of the statute" 'state[d] the correct interpretation
of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore's conviction became
final.'"
Ibid.
ley was convicted, he was convicted of a crime-armed
burglary-for which he may not be guilty. Therefore,
Michigan
v.
Long, 463
U. S. 1032 (1983), has no applicability here.
840
Per Curiam
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the ruling"
'merely clarified the plain language of the statute,'"
ibid., the question on which we originally granted
certiorari disappeared. Pennsylvania's answer revealed the "simple,
inevitable conclusion" that Fiore's conviction violated due
process.
Id., at 229. It has long been established by this
Court that "the Due Process Clause ... forbids a State to convict a
person of a crime without proving the elements of that crime beyond
a reasonable doubt."
Id., at 228-229. Because Pennsylvania
law-as interpreted by the later State Supreme Court decision-made
clear that Fiore's conduct did not violate an element of the
statute, his conviction did not satisfy the strictures of the Due
Process Clause. Consequently, "retroactivity [was] not at issue."
Id., at 226.
Fiore controls the result here. As Justice Pariente
stated in dissent, "application of the due process principles of
Fiore" may render a retroactivity analysis "unnecessary."
833 So. 2d, at 747. The question here is not just one of
retroactivity. Rather, as
Fiore holds, "retroactivity is not
at issue" if the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the
"common pocketknife" exception in
L. B. is "a correct
statement of the law when [Bunkley's] conviction became final." 531
U. S., at 226. The proper question under
Fiore is not
whether the law has changed. Rather,
Fiore requires that the
Florida Supreme Court answer whether, in light of
L. B.,
Bunkley's pocketknife of 2lf2 to 3 inches fit within §
790.001(13)'s "common pocketknife" exception at the time his
conviction became final.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the
L.
B. decision was merely an "evolutionary refinement" in the
meaning of the "common pocketknife" exception, it has not answered
whether the law in 1989 defined Bunkley's 2lf2to 3-inch pocketknife
as a "weapon" under § 790.001(13). Although the
L. B.
decision might have "culminat[ed] ... [the] century-long
evolutionary process," the question remains about what §
790.001(13) meant in 1989. 833 So. 2d, at 745.
841
If Bunkley's pocketknife fit within the "common pocketknife"
exception to § 790.001(13) in 1989, then Bunkley was convicted of a
crime for which he cannot be guilty-burglary in the first degree.
And if the "stages" of § 790.001(13)'s "evolution" had not
sufficiently progressed so that Bunkley's pocketknife was still a
weapon in 1989, this case raises the issue left open in
Fiore.
It is true that the Florida Supreme Court held
Fiore
inapplicable because the
L. B. decision was a change in the
law which "culminat[ed] [the] century-long evolutionary process."
833 So. 2d, at 745. As the dissent acknowledges, however, see
post, at 843, n. 1, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
L. B. cast doubt on the validity of Bunkley's conviction.
For the first time, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the
common pocketknife exception, and its interpretation covered the
weapon Bunkley possessed at the time of his offense. In the face of
such doubt,
Fiore entitles Bunkley to a determination as to
whether
L. B. correctly stated the common pocketknife
exception at the time he was convicted. Ordinarily, the Florida
Supreme Court's holding that
L. B. constitutes a change
in-rather than a clarification of-the law would be sufficient to
dispose of the
Fiore question. By holding that a change in
the law occurred, the Florida Supreme Court would thereby likewise
have signaled that the common pocketknife exception was narrower at
the time Bunkley was convicted.
Here, however, the Florida Supreme Court said more. It
characterized
L. B. as part of the "century-long
evolutionary process." 833 So. 2d, at 745. Because Florida law was
in a state of evolution over the course of these many years, we do
not know what stage in the evolutionary process the law had reached
at the time Bunkley was convicted. The Florida Supreme Court never
asked whether the weapons statute had "evolved" by 1989 to such an
extent that Bunkley's 2lf2- to 3-inch pocketknife fit within the
"common pocketknife" exception. The proper question under
Fiore is not
842
just
whether the law changed. Rather, it is
when
the law changed. The Florida Supreme Court has not answered this
question; instead, it appeared to assume that merely labeling
L.
B. as the "culmination" in the common pocketknife exception's
"century-long evolutionary process" was sufficient to resolve the
Fiore question. 833 So. 2d, at 745. It is not. Without
further clarification from the Florida Supreme Court as to the
content of the common pocketknife exception in 1989, we cannot know
whether
L. B. correctly stated the common pocketknife
exception at the time he was convicted.
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court should consider whether, in
light of the
L. B. decision, Bunkley's pocketknife of 2lf2
to 3 inches fit within § 790.001(13)'s "common pocketknife"
exception at the time his conviction became final. The judgment of
the Supreme Court of Florida, accordingly, is vacated, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE
THOMAS join, dissenting.
The Court here makes new law, and does so without briefing or
argument. In
Fiore v.
White, 528 U. S. 23, 29 (1999),
we granted certiorari to answer whether due process requires a
state court to apply a judicially announced change in state
criminal law retroactively. We realized after granting certiorari,
however, that we could not answer that question until we knew
whether there had been a change in the law at all. We therefore
certified a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking
whether its decision in
Commonwealth v.
Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A. 2d 1109, 1112 (1993), was
a change in the law from the time of the defendant's conviction.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court answered that there had been no
change, we acknowledged that there was no question of retroactivity
left for
843
us to answer.
Fiore v.
White, 531 U. S. 225, 226 (2001)
(per curiam).
In the present case, the Court concedes that the Florida Supreme
Court acknowledged our opinion in
Fiore. The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that its decision in
L. B. v.
State,
700 So. 2d 370 (1997)
(per curiam), decided after
petitioner's conviction became final, marked a change in Florida
law. 833 So. 2d 739, 744, n. 12 (2002).1 The state court therefore
considered whether the change should be applied retroactively, and
concluded that it should not be.
The Court recognizes, as it must, that the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that
L. B. was a change in the law from the time
of petitioner's conviction.
Ante, at 841 ("It is true that
the Florida Supreme Court held ... [that] the
L. B. decision
was a change in the law"). Yet the Court criticizes the Florida
Supreme Court for thinking that conclusion "sufficient to dispose
of the
Fiore question."
Ibid. The Court acknowledges
that "[o]rdinarily, the Florida Supreme Court's holding that
L.
B. constitutes a change in-rather than a clarification of-the
law would be sufficient to dispose of the
Fiore question,"
but then holds that, because the Florida Supreme Court
"characterized
L. B. as part of the 'century-long
evolutionary process,'"
Fiore requires that court to answer
an additional question: whether petitioner's knife fit within the"
'common pocketknife' " exception at the time of his conviction.
Ante, at 841.
Fiore requires no such thing.
Fiore asked whether
a change had occurred and, upon finding that none had, ended the
inquiry. The Court here goes much further. It acknowledges that
L. B. neither clarified the law that was in existence at the
time of petitioner's conviction nor changed the law with
retroactive effect. Yet it nonetheless insists
1 Petitioner presents strong arguments in favor of his view that
the bright-line rule set out in
L. B. existed as a matter of
Florida law at the time of his conviction. Pet. for Cert. 6. But
the Florida Supreme Court concluded otherwise, and we may not
revisit that question.
844
that the Florida Supreme Court reevaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case. See
ante, at 840, 842 (holding that
Florida Supreme Court must answer whether "Bunkley's pocketknife
... fit within [Fla. Stat.] § 790.001(13)'s 'common pocketknife'
exception at the time his conviction became final"). The Court
announces this conclusion as a matter of
"Fiore" without
explaining why due process requires it. The Court's holding is a
new one, and its criticism of the state court for failing to
anticipate this holding is unjustified.2 The Florida Supreme Court,
moreover, has essentially answered the question on which the Court
now remands.3
The Court's decision to expand
Fiore is not only new, it
also unjustifiably interferes with States' interest in finality.
The Florida courts have already considered several times the
question this Court now asks them to answer. On direct appeal,
petitioner specifically argued that a knife with a
2 The Court further criticizes the Florida Supreme Court for its
workmanship in the decision under review. Thus, while it recognizes
the Florida court's conclusion that
L. B. did not state the
law at the time of petitioner's conviction, the Court reprimands
the Florida court for failing to reach its holding in a
sufficiently clear manner. See,
e. g., ante,
at 842 ("Without further clarification from the Florida Supreme
Court ... we cannot know whether
L. B. correctly stated the
common pocketknife exception at the time [petitioner] was
convicted"). This rebuke to the state court violates the
well-established rule that this Court will not "require state
courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their
decisions."
Michigan v.
Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040
(1983); see also
id., at 1041 (noting the Court's desire to
"avoi[d] the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring
state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this
Court").
3 The state court explained that "[a]lthough some courts" prior
to
L. B. "may have interpreted 'common pocketknife' contrary
to the holding in
L. B., each court nevertheless sought to
comply with legislative intent and to rule in harmony with the law
as it was interpreted at that point in time." 833 So. 2d 739, 745
(Fla. 2002). Thus, the court explained, "none of the convictions
imposed pursuant to section 790.001(13) violated the Due Process
Clause."
Ibid.
845
blade of less than four inches was a "common pocketknife," and
he cited the 1951 opinion letter issued by the Florida Attorney
General on this issue. Brief for Appellant in No. 88-1376 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), pp. 5-6. Petitioner also filed two motions for
state postconviction relief challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to the jury's conclusion that he was armed
with a dangerous weapon. See Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Judgment
and Sentence in No. 86-1070-CF-A-N1 (Fla. Cir. Ct.), p. 4; Petition
to Invoke "All Writs" Jurisdiction in No. 85-778 (Fla. Sup. Ct.),
p. 4.4
Florida has established a 2-year period of limitations for
filing motions for postconviction relief. Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 "provides an exception to the twoyear time
limitation for filing postconviction motions where 'a fundamental
constitutional right asserted was not established within the period
provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.'" 768
So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. App.
2000) (per curiam) (quoting Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.850(b)(2) (2000)). The Court's decision here
overrides Florida's Rule, authorizing claims for postconviction
relief where there has been a change in the law that has
specifically been held
not to apply retroactively.
The Court's holding expanding
Fiore is striking, and the
Court's decision to adopt it summarily is even more so. I would
deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
4 Petitioner also unsuccessfully raised this claim twice in
Federal District Court. See Report and Recommendation in No.
91-113-CIV-T99(B) (MD Fla.), p. 5; Memorandum of Law in Support of
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under U. S. C. Section 2254 in
No. 96-405-Civ.-T-24C (MD Fla.), p. 5.
846
The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 845
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to
publish the orders with
permanent page numbers, thus making
the official citations available upon publication of the
preliminary prints of the United States Reports.
847
MARCH 7, 2003 Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 02-990. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.
V. GENTRY
ET AL. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule
46. Reported below: 254 Ga. App. 888, 564 S. E. 2d 733.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 02-479. MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA
V. HASON. C. A.
9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 537 U. S. 1028.] Case removed from
argument calendar for Tuesday, March 25, 2003.
No. 02-5664. SELL
V. UNITED STATES. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 537 U. S. 999.] Motion of the Solicitor
General for leave to file a supplemental brief in excess of the
page limit granted.
MARCH 10, 2003
Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded
No. 01-1487. MAYLE, WARDEN, ET AL.
V. BROWN ET AL. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded for further consideration in light of
Lockyer
v.
Andrade, ante, p. 63. Reported below:
283 F.3d
1019.
No. 01-9879. HERBERT
V. UNITED STATES. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded for further consideration in light of
Clay v.
United States, 537 U. S. 522 (2003).
Reported below: 22 Fed. Appx. 285.
No. 01-10898. SIFFORD
V. UNITED STATES. C. A. 4th
Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
case re901
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