On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
The petitioner Ira Borchardt challenges a judgment of the Fifth
Circuit affirming his felony conviction for violations of the
currency laws. A federal jury sitting in the Northern District of
Texas found that Borchardt smuggled large sums of currency out of
the country in furtherance of an illegal scheme to purchase and
import marihuana from Mexico. Borchardt contends that,
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 938
because he already had been convicted of conspiracy-to-import
charges by a federal jury sitting in the Southern District of
Texas, the Northern District prosecution and conviction for the
currency offenses violated his right under the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause not to be tried successively for the same
criminal acts. The Government responds that (1) there was no double
jeopardy violation; and (2) in any event, Borchardt's Sixth
Amendment venue rights precluded the joinder of all charges at a
single trial.
I believe this case presents an important question whether the
second prosecution and conviction impermissibly rest on criminal
acts that formed the basis of Borchardt's first conviction. I also
believe the case presents an important question whether the
Government improperly has exploited Borchardt's venue rights to
defeat his right otherwise to be secure from repetitious
prosecutions for the same criminal acts. The venue issue, in
particular, is a substantial federal question that is likely to
recur with frequency. I therefore respectfully dissent from the
Court's denial of certiorari.
I
Borchardt began to conspire with several other individuals in
August 1980 to import marihuana from Mexico into the Dallas-Fort
Worth area, which is in the Northern District of Texas. Twice that
autumn, Borchardt and his co-conspirators surreptitiously flew a
total of $126,000 from the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport to Mexico City
for the purpose of purchasing marihuana. Borchardt spent much of
the next several months in Mexico making preparations to transport
the purchases back into the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Between
December 1980 and February 1981, he arranged for three airplane
flights that carried a total of approximately 2,600 pounds of
marihuana. The scheme began to unravel when, during the third
flight on February 22, 1981, the airplane encountered bad weather,
ran out of fuel, and crash-landed outside the town of Raymondville,
which is in the Southern District of Texas. Borchardt, who had
remained behind in Mexico, returned to this country and was
arrested shortly thereafter.
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas
obtained an indictment in December 1981. Borchardt was charged with
importing marihuana into the Southern District on February 22,
1981, and with constructively possessing marihuana on that date
with the intent to distribute it. He also was charged with
conspiring, "from on or about November 1, 1980, to on or
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 939
about February 26, 1981," to import, possess, and distribute
marihuana. 1 Record 27. The conspiracy charges against Borchardt
rested on his role in smuggling the currency into Mexico on the two
occasions discussed above, his supervision of the shipments from
Mexico, and his participation in various planning meetings and
telephone conferences. The jury convicted Borchardt on all counts,
and the District Court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
United States v. Borchardt,
698 F.2d
697 (1983).
In July 1982, shortly after Borchardt's conviction in the
Southern District, the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Texas obtained a second indictment relating to the
importation conspiracy. Borchardt was charged with two counts of
violating the currency laws; these counts represented the two
occasions he had smuggled currency into Mexico.1 Specifically, the
indictment charged that Borchardt on these two occasions had
violated 31 U.S.C. 1059 (1976 ed.), which proscribed the willful
failure to file currency reports when taking money out of the
country "where the violation is . . . committed in furtherance of
the commission of any other violation of Federal law . . ."
(emphasis added).2 The Northern District indictment charged
that
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 940
Borchardt had violated the currency-reporting requirements "in
furtherance of . . . the illegal importation of marijuana." 1
Record 10-11.
Borchardt moved to dismiss the second indictment. Id., at 24;
see also id., at 294. He argued that his currency smuggling already
had been used in the Southern District trial to obtain his
conviction for conspiracy to import and distribute marihuana, that
a second trial would require the same evidence concerning the same
acts as had been elicited at the first, and that to obtain a
conviction under 1059 the Government would have to retry the
underlying felonies that he had been convicted of only months
before. The District Court denied Borchardt's motion. 3 Record 26;
11 Record 3-4. The jury convicted Borchardt of both counts, and the
court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of four years for each
violation, to be served consecutively to the sentence he was
serving for the conviction in the Southern District of Texas. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion, No. 82-1719 (Dec.
20, 1983), judgment order reported at
723 F.2d
905, and denied panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.
II
This case does not implicate the acknowledged power of the
Federal Government to seek, at a single criminal trial, separate
and consecutive punishments for various aspects of a single
criminal act. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333 ( 1981).
Rather, it presents the "entirely different constitutional issue"
whether such multiple punishments may be obtained through "multiple
prosecutions of the same offenses." Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S.
187, 198, 672 (1959) (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J.)
(emphasis added). I adhere to my view that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that, except in extremely
limited circumstances not present here, "all the charges against a
defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence,
episode, or transaction" be prosecuted in one proceeding. Ashe v.
Swenson,
397 U.S.
436, 453-454, 1199-1200 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053 ( 1977) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), and cases collected therein.
In the instant case, the Federal Government in the Southern
District marshaled an array of evidence to demonstrate that
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 941
Borchardt had twice smuggled currency out of the country, and it
used these episodes along with evidence of other conspiratorial
acts to obtain Borchardt's conviction for conspiring to violate,
inter alia, 21 U.S.C. 952(a) (importation of controlled
substances). Thereafter, in the Northern District trial, the
Government again marshaled its array of evidence to demonstrate
again that Borchardt had participated in the two smuggling episodes
and that he had done so for the purpose of violating 21 U.S.C.
952(a). Thus the Government twice prosecuted Borchardt for the
identical criminal acts, which in my view was in palpable violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. [
Footnote 3]
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 942
III
The Government appears to concede that the second prosecution
would normally violate, at the very least, its Petite policy of
trying all related offenses in a single trial. Brief in Opposition
4-5; see Petite v. United States,
361 U.S. 529 (1960).4 But
it insists that such joinder was impossible here because neither
the Southern District nor the Northern District had venue to try
all the offenses. Specifically, the Government contends that the
two substantive offenses of importation and possession with intent
to distribute, which grew out of the presence of the marihuana on
Southern District soil after the plane crash on February 22, had to
be tried in the Southern District. On the other hand, because the
currency offenses occurred at Borchardt's port of departure at the
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, see n. 2, supra, only the Northern
District had venue to try these crimes. The Government concedes
that Borchardt could have been tried on the all-embracing
conspiracy charges in the Northern District, but because he already
" necessarily faced two trials in separate districts," it contends,
there was no logical reason why the conspiracy charges had to be
tried with the currency charges rather than with the possession
charges. Accepting arguendo the Government's contention that venue
for the possession and currency offenses initially rested in
separate districts,5 this analysis nevertheless fails for two
reasons.
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 943
A
First, that Borchardt already faced trial in the Southern
District on the substantive possession charges could not serve to
justify separate trials on the conspiracy and currency charges. The
Double Jeopardy Clause does not of course shield a defendant
against separate trials for separate criminal acts, but only
against separate trials growing out of the same criminal acts.
Prosecution for the substantive possession charges alone would not
have barred a subsequent prosecution on the currency charges,
because the two crimes were based on different episodes. The former
charges did not rest in any way on Borchardt's earlier smuggling of
money out of the country, but rather on Borchardt's constructive
possession of the marihuana on the crashed plane, i.e., on evidence
that Borchardt had loaded the plane and thereby intended to
exercise dominion and control over its cargo. See n. 5, supra.
The conspiracy and currency prosecutions, on the other hand,
were largely of a piece because they rested on the same criminal
episodes. The Government's decision to prosecute Borchardt for
conspiracy based in part on his acts of smuggling currency
necessarily triggered Borchardt's Fifth Amendment right not to be
put into jeopardy again, on whatever theory of liability, for his
commission of those same acts. As the Government concedes, the
conspiracy and currency charges easily could have been consolidated
in the Northern District. Having made its decision to prosecute
Borchardt's acts of smuggling currency to obtain the conspiracy
conviction in the Southern District, however, the Government should
not now be permitted to bootstrap its way around the Double
Jeopardy Clause by pointing to the pendency of other charges in the
Southern District that bore no double jeopardy relation to the
currency charges.
Petite v. United States, supra, is squarely on point. There
Petite had been convicted in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 944
for conspiring to make false statements to Government agencies
on two occasions, once in Philadelphia and once in Baltimore.
Petite subsequently was convicted in the District of Maryland on
substantive charges growing out of the same Baltimore agency
proceedings. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to vacate
the judgment after the Government candidly conceded that the second
trial violated the Government's own policy against repetitious
prosecutions for crimes growing out of a single transaction. Id.,
at 530-531. Although the Court avoided the constitutional issue,
three of us went on to emphasize that "the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment was an insurmountable barrier to this second
prosecution." Id., at 533, 80 S. Ct., at 452 (BRENNAN, J., joined
by Black and Douglas, JJ.).6
B
Even if the conspiracy charges could only have been brought in
the Southern District, however, I believe that the Government
fundamentally misperceives the relationship between a defendant's
venue rights and his double jeopardy rights. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that an accused " shall enjoy the right to a
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 945
speedy and public trial . . . [in the] district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." Because the venue provision was
designed primarily to safeguard a defendant's rights,7 it is one
that a defendant may waive in appropriate circumstances. See Singer
v. United States,
380 U.S.
24, 35, 790 (1965); see also Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 21(b) ("For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of
justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the
proceeding as to him or any one or more of the counts thereof to
another district").
If the Government simultaneously had secured indictments against
Borchardt in the Northern and Southern Districts, he could have
waived venue in one of the districts pursuant to Rule 21(b),
obtained a joinder of the two prosecutions, and thereby vindicated
his right not to be tried twice for the same criminal episodes.
Borchardt was not accorded this opportunity, however, because the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas waited
until several months after Borchardt's conviction in the Southern
District before bringing the currency charges. The Government has
suggested no reason for this delay. [
Footnote 8]
The Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that all charges arising
out of the same criminal act will be brought both at the same time
and in the same proceeding. In some situations the Sixth
Amendment's venue safeguards will prevent the Government from
bringing all charges in one district, but this should not serve to
excuse the Government's obligation under the Fifth Amendment to
bring the charges at the same time. The defendant at the very least
is entitled to be "informed at one time of all the charges on which
he will actually be tried," Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S., at 455 n. 11
n. 11. (BRENNAN, J., concurring), so that he has a full opportunity
to choose between his right to venue in separate districts and his
right to a single trial on all related charges. The Government's
alternative argument-that a federal prosecutor
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 946
may in his own discretion choose to use a defendant's venue
rights to defeat the double jeopardy safeguard-lacks any principled
foundation. For whether a defendant is tried successively for the
same acts in the same judicial district or in separate districts,
"[r]epetitive harassment in such a manner goes to the heart of the
Fifth Amendment protection." Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S., at
200 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Whether they occur in one
district or in several districts, repetitious prosecutions for the
same acts enable the Government to "wear the accused out by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S.
319, 328, 153 (1937). Both sorts of prosecutions enable the
Government "with all its resources and power . . . to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . .
." Green v. United States,
355 U.S.
184, 187, 223 (1957). Both should be subject to equal
condemnation under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
It might be argued that the Southern District of Texas and the
Northern District of Texas are separate judicial districts, and
that the Double Jeopardy Clause should not extend to require
coordination among federal prosecutors acting independently in
separate districts. This objection, grounded on notions of
bureaucratic autonomy, is thoroughly unpersuasive. The federal
districts are not separate sovereign entities, but merely adjuncts
of one federal sovereign. We repeatedly have held that a sovereign
government may not structure its judicial and prosecutorial systems
so as otherwise to defeat the safeguard against double jeopardy.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil,
409 U.S. 505 (1973)
(rejecting "dual sovereignty" doctrine with respect to separate
state and municipal prosecutions); Waller v. Florida,
397 U.S. 387 (1970)
(same); Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907) (same
with respect to separate federal and territorial prosecutions).
Similarly, where different prosecutions grow out of the same
criminal act and would therefore otherwise be subject to the Double
Jeopardy Clause, a sovereign should not be able to regulate the
timing of those prosecutions in different districts so as to defeat
a defendant's right to seek a single consolidated trial.
Such a rule would not impose undue hardship on federal
prosecutors. It would merely require that the Government coordinate
its prosecutions of individuals in different districts in such
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 947
a way that the individuals were not forced to travel from
district to district defending against "[r]epetitive harassment,"
Abbate v. United States, supra, 359 U.S., at 200 (separate opinion
of BRENNAN, J.), for the same criminal acts. Whether it results
from an intent to harass, simple caprice, or a breakdown in
communications among federal prosecutors, the Government's failure
to coordinate its caseload cannot be allowed to undermine a
defendant's ability to avoid double jeopardy.
Accordingly, this case presents the question whether we should
hold that where multiple charges would otherwise be required to be
brought in a single proceeding but for problems of venue among the
judicial districts of one sovereign government, the Double Jeopardy
Clause nevertheless requires the sovereign to bring all such
charges within a reasonable time of each other. [
Footnote 9] In this way, the defendant would be
able to seek to transfer the proceedings against him and to
consolidate all charges for one trial, thereby vindicating his
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to be secure from successive
prosecutions for the same criminal conduct. [
Footnote 10]
Page 469 U.S.
937 , 948
In the instant case, Ira Borchardt was prosecuted in one
District for conspiracy to import marihuana, largely on the basis
of his efforts to smuggle money out of the country to facilitate
the purchase and importation of the substance. Immediately
thereafter he was prosecuted again, this time for currency
violations. Once again, Borchardt's conviction was grounded on his
efforts to smuggle currency out of the country in furtherance of
the conspiracy. But for asserted problems of venue, the Government
should have been required to bring these charges in a single
indictment. See Part II, supra. For whatever reason, the Government
instead timed its interdistrict prosecutions of Borchardt so as to
deny him his right to seek a consolidation of these charges under
Rule 21(b), thereby stripping him of the only effective means to
invoke his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause and to seek to
have all charges arising out of the currency smuggling resolved in
a single trial.
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 Borchardt also
was charged with two cocaine offenses, and the jury ultimately
convicted him of one count of possessing cocaine. He received a
2-year sentence for this offense, to be served consecutively to the
currency sentences discussed infra, at 940. The cocaine conviction
is not infirm on double jeopardy grounds. Although Borchardt argues
that the cocaine and marihuana offenses were but segments of an
overarching continuing conspiracy to import drugs, and therefore
should have been tried together, the Government's proof on the
cocaine charge rested on entirely different overt acts from the
marihuana and currency charges.
Footnote 2 Later in 1982,
this provision was amended and recodified at 31 U.S. C. 5322(b),
which now prohibits the willful failure to file the required
reports "while violating another law of the United States or as
part of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions of
more than $100,000 in a 12-month period . . . ." Borchardt's duty
to file a currency report arose from 31 U.S.C. 1101(a)(1)(A) (1976
ed.), which provided that anyone who knowingly "transports or
causes to be transported monetary instruments . . . from any place
within the United States to or through any place outside the United
States, . . . in an amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion"
must file a report thereof. This provision has been recodified
without substantive change at 31 U.S.C. 5316. See also 31 CFR
103.25(b) (1984) (providing for the filing of such reports "with
the Customs officer in charge at any Customs port of . . .
departure").
Footnote 3 A majority of the
Court continues to apply the "same evidence" test in determining
whether successive prosecutions are constitutional, tempered only
by application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine. See, e. g.,
Ashe v. Swenson,
397
U.S. 436 (1970). Under this approach, the inquiry "is whether
each [statutory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not." Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S.
299, 304, 182 (1932). The constitutionality of Borchardt's
currency conviction is highly suspect even under this line of
analysis. Borchardt was convicted in the Southern District of both
importing and conspiring to import marihuana in violation of, inter
alia, 21 U.S.C. 952(a). He thereafter was convicted in the Northern
District of violating 31 U.S.C. 1059 (1976 ed.) on the basis of
proof that he (1) willfully failed to file the required currency
reports, in furtherance of (2) importing marihuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. 952( a). The second conviction rested on an element not
necessary to the first conviction (willful failure to file
reports), but the first conviction did not rest on any elements
that the Government did not also have to prove the second time
around. "[A] person [who] has been tried and convicted for a crime
which has various incidents included in it, . . . cannot be a
second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice
put in jeopardy for the same offence." In re Nielsen,
131 U.S.
176, 188, 676 (1889). The reverse is of course also true: a
person who has been tried for an offense consisting of certain
elements cannot thereafter be tried for an offense consisting of
the same elements plus others. See, e. g., Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S.
410, 421, 2267 (1980); Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977).
The Government contends, however, that the "same evidence" test
is not met here because the underlying felony required for
conviction under 31 U.S.C. 1059 (1976 ed.) could have been any one
of numerous felonies other than the importation of marihuana. "The
various elements of the marijuana charges . . . are completely
unrelated to the currency reporting offense, which could be
established if the related crime were arson, bribery, extortion,
fraud, or any number of other crimes." Brief in Opposition 5. We
rejected just such a facile construction of felony- murder statutes
in Harris v. Oklahoma,
433 U.S. 682, 53 L. Ed.
2d 1054 (1977); see also Illinois v. Vitale, supra, 447 U.S., at
420- 421, and should do so here as well.
Footnote 4 The Government
has long represented to the Court that it adheres to a policy that
"several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be
alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of
multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of
fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law
enforcement." Petite v. United States, 361 U.S., at 530.
Footnote 5 The Government
suggests only that it is "doubtful" whether the importation and
possession charges arising out of the plane crash could have been
brought in the Northern District. Brief in Opposition 5. The
record, however, appears to indicate otherwise. Borchardt did not
accompany the plane from Mexico, so he never actually possessed
marihuana in the Southern District. The Government's case rested
instead on constructive possession and importation. As the Fifth
Circuit summarized, " Borchardt's participation in the venture in
loading the marijuana and the calls to him and his activities after
the crash would permit the jury to infer that he had constructive
possession of the marijuana." United States v. Borchardt,
698 F.2d
697, 703 (1983) (emphasis added). The record shows that these
postcrash activities occurred in the Northern District of Texas.
See 1 Record 6. On the Government's own evidence, Borchardt took
steps to retain dominion and control over the marihuana while he
was in the Northern District, so venue would appear to lie in that
District for the continuing-offense possession and importation
charges. See, e. g., United States v. Brantley,
733 F.2d
1429, 1433-1435 ( CA11 1984); United States v. Brunty,
701 F.2d
1375, 1382 (CA11), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983). See also
18 U. S.C. 3237(a) ("[A]ny offense . . . may be inquired of and
prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed").
Footnote 6 Of course, if the
Government in Petite had tried the conspiracy charges in the
District of Maryland and had relied on the Philadelphia false
statements to obtain the conspiracy conviction, it could not
thereafter have prosecuted Petite in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for making the false Philadelphia statements.
Similarly, if the Government in the instant case had prosecuted the
conspiracy and currency offenses together in the Northern District
of Texas and had relied on the February 22 importation and
possession outside of Raymondville to obtain the conspiracy
conviction, it could not thereafter have prosecuted Borchardt for
the substantive offenses in the Southern District. It might be
argued that these results unjustly prevent the Government from
fully presenting all evidence of a conspiracy when venue problems
preclude it from joining all underlying substantive offenses to the
conspiracy prosecution; in such situations, it would be argued, the
Government must choose between the equally unattractive options of
(a) presenting evidence of all the underlying acts in the
conspiracy prosecution, thereby forfeiting the opportunity to
secure a subsequent conviction on the underlying substantive
offense in a district with proper venue, or (b) withholding
evidence of certain acts from the conspiracy prosecution, thereby
preserving a subsequent prosecution for the underlying offense but
risking a verdict of not guilty on the conspiracy charge for lack
of sufficient evidence. The procedure outlined in Part III-B,
infra, however, provides a full and efficient method for the
Government to preserve its opportunity to prosecute for all
offenses and to present its full array of evidence.
Footnote 7 "The provision
for trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the
unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a
remote place." United States v. Cores,
356 U.S.
405, 407, 877 (1958).
Footnote 8 All of the
evidence the Government relied upon in the second trial was
available at the time of the first indictment, as witnessed by the
Government's use of the currency episodes to prove the importation
conspiracy. Thus this is not a case where, despite diligent
efforts, the Government had not assembled the evidence necessary to
prove its second case at the time the first was initiated. See, e.
g., Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S.
442, 448-449, 251 (1912).
Footnote 9 It is of course
difficult for the Government to coordinate the bringing of charges
in different districts with chronometric precision. Delays might
result, for example, from backlog, from the differing schedules of
grand juries in separate districts, and so forth. Even after two
prosecutions are brought, further delays might sometimes be
encountered in transferring and consolidating the cases for trial.
Some room for reasonable flexibility should therefore be accorded
the Government, and in instances of such reasonable delay a
defendant might have to postpone his exercise of speedy-trial
rights to accommodate the joinder of all offenses against him in a
single proceeding. Requiring such accommodation is reasonable.
Under the federal Speedy Trial Act, for example, courts may exclude
in computing the time within which a trial must commence any delay
resulting from, inter alia, "any proceeding relating to the
transfer of a case . . . from another district under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure" and any "continuance granted by any
judge . . . at the request of the defendant or his counsel." 18
U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(G), 3161(h)(8)(A). In all instances the inquiry
must be whether the delay is reasonable and whether the Government
has so coordinated its interdistrict prosecutions as to permit the
defendant meaningfully to exercise his right to seek a transfer and
joinder of charges in one proceeding.
Footnote 10 Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 21(b) gives the district court discretion
whether to permit a transfer to another district. Where a defendant
seeks a transfer to protect against double jeopardy, his interest
in securing a transfer would approach its zenith and the district
court's discretion accordingly would be narrowly circumscribed.
There is no need here to decide whether the "interests of justice"
could ever lead a court in the reasonable exercise of its
discretion to deny a transfer in such circumstances. Even where
there is room for discretion, however, it is important in the
context of the Double Jeopardy Clause that "the decision on whether
charges are to be tried jointly or separately . . . rest with the
judge rather than the prosecutor." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S ., at
455, n. 11, n. 11 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (re discretionary
exercise of Rule 14 authority).
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment