OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
BOGAN ET AL.
v. SCOTT-HARRIS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT
No. 96-1569. Argued December 3, 1997-Decided March 3,1998
Respondent Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983
against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, petitioners Bogan
(the city's mayor) and Roderick (the vice president of the city
council), and other officials, alleging that the elimination of the
city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was
motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her
for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing a complaint
against another city employee. The District Court twice denied
petitioners' motions to dismiss on the ground of absolute immunity
from suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants
on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city and
petitioners liable on respondent's First Amendment claim. The First
Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the
judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Although concluding that
petitioners have absolute immunity from civil liability for damages
arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative
activities, that court held that their conduct in introducing,
voting for, and signing the ordinance that eliminated respondent's
office was not "legislative." Relying on the jury's finding that
respondent's constitutionally sheltered speech was a substantial or
motivating factor underlying petitioners' conduct, the court
reasoned that the conduct was administrative, rather than
legislative, because Roderick and Bogan relied on facts relating to
a particular individual, respondent, in the decisionmaking
calculus.
Held:
1. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity
from civil liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities
as has long been accorded to federal, state, and regional
legislators. See,
e. g., Tenney v.
Brandhove,
341 U. S. 367,
372, 372-376;
Amy v.
Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 138,
distinguished. Such immunity finds pervasive support not only in
common-law cases and older treatises, but also in reason. See
Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376. The rationales for according
absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply
with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of
government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be
inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of
personal liability. See,
e. g., id., at 377. Furthermore,
the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are
45
of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time
citizenlegislator remains commonplace. See
ibid. And the
threat of liability may significantly deter service in local
government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in
comparison to the threat of civilliability. See
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 827
(Burger, C. J., dissenting). Moreover, certain deterrents to
legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other
levels of government, including the availability of municipal
liability for constitutional violations,
e. g., Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U. S. 391,
405, n. 29, and the ultimate check on legislative abuse, the
electoral process, cf.
Tenney, supra, at 378. Indeed, any
argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend
to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by
Lake Country
Estates, supra, at 401-402. pp.48-54.
2. Petitioners' actions in this case were protected by absolute
immunity, which attaches to all acts taken "in the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity."
Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376.
The First Circuit erroneously relied on petitioners' subjective
intent in resolving whether their acts so qualified. Whether an act
is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than
on the motive or intent of the official performing it.
Id.,
at 370, 377. This Court has little trouble concluding that,
stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners'
actions were legislative. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick's
acts of voting for the ordinance eliminating respondent's office
were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan's
introduction of a budget that proposed the elimination of city jobs
and his signing the ordinance into law also were formally
legislative, even though he was an executive official. Officials
outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity
when they perform legislative functions, see
Supreme Court of
Va. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731-334;
Bogan's actions were legislative because they were integral steps
in the legislative process. Cf.,
e. g., Edwards v.
United
States, 286 U. S. 482, 490. Furthermore, this particular
ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional
legislation: It reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision
implicating the city's budgetary priorities and its services to
constituents; it involved the termination of a position, which,
unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have
prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular
occupant of the office; and, in eliminating respondent's office, it
governed in a field where legislators traditionally have power to
act,
Tenney, supra, at 379. pp.54-56.
134 F.3d
427, reversed.
46
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs
were Thomas E. Shirley, Bruce A. Assad, and Robert J. Marchand.
Harvey A. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Siobhan M. Sweeney and Eric
Schnapper. *
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is well established that federal, state, and regional
legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability
for their legislative activities. In this case, petitioners argue
that they, as local officials performing legislative functions, are
entitled to the same protection. They further argue that their acts
of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating
the government office held by respondent constituted legislative
activities. We agree on both counts and therefore reverse the
judgment below.
I
Respondent Janet Scott-Harris was administrator of the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the city of Fall
River, Massachusetts, from 1987 to 1991. In 1990, respondent
received a complaint that Dorothy Biltcliffe, an employee serving
temporarily under her supervision, had made repeated racial and
ethnic slurs about her colleagues. After respondent prepared
termination charges against Biltcliffe, Biltcliffe used her
political connections to press her case with several state and
local officials, including
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, by
Thomas F.
McGuire, Jr., and
Mary E. O'Neil; for the
Massachusetts Municipal Association et al. by
George J.
Leontire; and for the National League of Cities et al. by
Richard Ruda and
Charles Rothfeld.
47
petitioner Marilyn Roderick, the vice president of the Fall
River City Council. The city council held a hearing on the charges
against Biltcliffe and ultimately accepted a settlement proposal
under which Biltcliffe would be suspended without pay for 60 days.
Petitioner Daniel Bogan, the mayor of Fall River, thereafter
substantially reduced the punishment.
While the charges against Biltcliffe were pending, Mayor Bogan
prepared his budget proposal for the 1992 fiscal year. Anticipating
a 5 to 10 percent reduction in state aid, Bogan proposed freezing
the salaries of all municipal employees and eliminating 135 city
positions. As part of this package, Bogan called for the
elimination of DHHS, of which respondent was the sole employee. The
city council ordinance committee, which was chaired by Roderick,
approved an ordinance eliminating DHHS. The city council thereafter
adopted the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 2, with petitioner Roderick
among those voting in favor. Bogan signed the ordinance into
law.
Respondent then filed suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, against the city, Bogan, Roderick, and several other city
officials. She alleged that the elimination of her position was
motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her
for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint
against Biltcliffe. The District Court denied Bogan's and
Roderick's motions to dismiss on the ground of legislative
immunity, and the case proceeded to trial.
Scott-Harris v.
City of Fall River, et al., Civ. 91-12057-PBS (Mass., Jan.
27, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert.1.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the
racial discrimination charge, but found the city, Bogan, and
Roderick liable on respondent's First Amendment claim, concluding
that respondent's constitutionally protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the elimina-
48
tion of her position.1 On a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the District Court again denied Bogan's and Roderick's
claims of absolute legislative immunity, reasoning that "the
ordinance amendment passed by the city council was an
individually-targeted administrative act, rather than a neutral,
legislative elimination of a position which incidentally resulted
in the termination of plaintiff."
Id., at 20.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set
aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments
against Roderick and Bogan.
Scott-Harris v.
Fall
River,
134 F.3d
427 (1997).2 Although the court concluded that petitioners have
"absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of
their performance of legitimate legislative activities," id., at
440, it held that their challenged conduct was not "legislative,"
id., at 441. Relying on the jury's finding that "constitutionally
sheltered speech was a substantial or motivating factor" underlying
petitioners' conduct, the court reasoned that the conduct was
administrative, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan
"relied on facts relating to a particular individual [respondent]
in the decisionmaking calculus."
Ibid. We granted
certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997).
II
The principle that legislators are absolutely immune from
liability for their legislative activities has long been recognized
in Anglo-American law. This privilege "has taproots
1 Respondent dropped several other defendants from the suit, and
the District Court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Robert
Connors, the Fall River City Administrator. Only the city, Bogan,
and Roderick were appellants in the Court of Appeals, and only the
latter two are petitioners in this Court.
2 The court held that the city was not liable because the jury
could reasonably infer unlawful intent only as to two of the city
council members, and municipal liability could not rest "on so
frail a foundation." 134 F. 3d, at 440.
49
in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries" and was "taken as a matter of course by those who
severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation."
Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372
(1951). The Federal Constitution, the Constitutions of many of the
newly independent States, and the common law thus protected
legislators from liability for their legislative activities. See U.
S. Const., Art. I, § 6;
Tenney, supra, at 372-375.
Recognizing this venerable tradition, we have held that state
and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from
liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities. See
Tenney, supra (state legislators);
Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979)
(regional legislators); 3 see also
Kilbourn v.
Thompson,
103 U. S. 168, 202-204 (1881) (interpreting the federal Speech
and Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, to provide similar
immunity to Members of Congress). We explained that legislators
were entitled to absolute immunity from suit at common law and that
Congress did not intend the general language of § 1983 to "impinge
on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason."
Tenney,
supra, at 376. Because the common law accorded local
legislators the same absolute immunity it accorded legislators at
other levels of government, and because the rationales for such
immunity are fully applicable to local legislators, we now hold
that local legislators are likewise absolutely immune from suit
under § 1983 for their legislative activities.
The common law at the time § 1983 was enacted deemed local
legislators to be absolutely immune from suit for their legislative
activities. New York's highest court, for example, held that
municipal aldermen were immune from suit for
3 The "regional" legislature in
Lake Country Estates was
the governing body of an agency created by a compact between two
States to coordinate and regulate development in a region
encompassing portions of both States.
Lake Country Estates
v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S., at 394.
50
their discretionary decisions.
Wilson v.
New York,
1 Denio 595 (1845). The court explained that when a local
legislator exercises discretionary powers, he "is exempt from all
responsibility by action for the motives which influence him, and
the manner in which such duties are performed. If corrupt, he may
be impeached or indicted, but the law will not tolerate an action
to redress the individual wrong which may have been done."
Id., at 599.4 These principles, according to the court, were
"too familiar and well settled to require illustration or
authority."
Id., at 599-600.
Shortly after § 1983 was enacted, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion, holding that town aldermen could not
be held liable under state law for their role in the adoption of an
allegedly unlawful ordinance.
Jones v.
Loving, 55
Miss. 109, 30 Am. Rep. 508 (1877). The court explained that "[i]t
certainly cannot be argued that the motives of the individual
members of a legislative assembly, in voting for a particular law,
can be inquired into, and its supporters be made personally liable,
upon an allegation that they acted maliciously towards the person
aggrieved by the passage of the law."
Id., at 111, 30 Am.
Rep., at 509. The court thus concluded that "[w]henever the
officers of a municipal corporation are vested with legislative
powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are
clothed with
4 The court distinguished "discretionary" duties, which were
protected absolutely, and "ministerial" duties, which were not.
Although the court described the former as "judicial" in nature, it
was merely using the term broadly to encompass the "discretionary"
acts of officials. See 1 Denio, at 599 ("[I]f his powers are
discretionary, to be exerted or withheld, according to his own view
of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature
judicial"). The legislators' actions in
Wilson were
unquestionably legislative in both form and substance. Thus,
Wilson was widely, and correctly, cited as a leading case
regarding
legislative immunity. See,
e. g., T.
Cooley, Law of Torts 377, n. 1 (1880) (hereinafter Cooley); F.
Mechem, Law of Public Offices and Officers § 644, p. 431, n. 1
(1890) (hereinafter Mechem); M. Throop, Law Relating to Public
Officers § 709, p. 671, n. 1 (1892).
51
all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all
liability for their mistaken use."
Ibid.
Treatises of that era confirm that this was the pervasive view.
A leading treatise on municipal corporations explained that
"[w]here the
officers of a municipal corporation are
invested with legislative powers, they
are exempt from
individual liability for the passage of any ordinance within
their authority, and their motives in reference thereto will not be
inquired into." 1 J. Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations § 313,
pp. 326-327 (3d ed. 1881) (emphasis in original). Thomas Cooley
likewise noted in his influential treatise on the law of torts that
the "rightful exemption" of legislators from liability was "very
plain" and applied to members of "inferior legislative bodies, such
as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils, and
the like." Cooley 376; see also J. Bishop, Commentaries on the
Non-Contract Law § 744 (1889) (noting that municipal legislators
were immune for their legislative functions); Mechem §§ 644-646
(same); Throop,
supra n. 4, § 709, at 671 (same).
Even the authorities cited by respondent are consistent with the
view that local legislators were absolutely immune for their
legislative, as distinct from ministerial, duties. In the few cases
in which liability did attach, the courts emphasized that the
defendant officials lacked discretion, and the duties were thus
ministerial. See,
e. g., Morris v.
The People, 3
Denio 381, 395 (N. Y. 1846) (noting that the duty was "of a
ministerial character only");
Caswell v.
Allen, 7
Johns. 63, 68 (N. Y. 1810) (holding supervisors liable because the
act was "mandatory" and "[n]o discretion appear[ed] to [have been]
given to the supervisors"). Respondent's heavy reliance on our
decision in
Amy v.
Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1871),
is misguided for this very reason. In that case, we held that local
legislators could be held liable for violating a court order to
levy a tax sufficient to pay a judgment, but only because the court
order had created a ministerial duty.
Id., at 138 ("The rule
is well settled, that where the law re-
52
quires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public
officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be
compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising
from his conduct"). The treatises cited by respondent confirm that
this distinction between legislative and ministerial duties was
dispositive of the right to absolute immunity. See,
e. g.,
Cooley 377 (stating that local legislators may be held liable only
for their "ministerial" duties); Mechem § 647 (same).
Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds
support not only in history, but also in reason. See
Tenney
v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 376 (stating that Congress did
not intend for § 1983 to "impinge on a tradition so well grounded
in history and reason"). The rationales for according absolute
immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with
equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of
government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be
inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of
personal liability. See
Spallone v.
United States,
493 U. S. 265, 279 (1990) (noting, in the context of addressing
local legislative action, that "any restriction on a legislator's
freedom undermines the 'public good' by interfering with the rights
of the people to representation in the democratic process"); see
also
Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S., at 201-204
(federal legislators);
Tenney, supra, at 377 (state
legislators);
Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 405
(regional legislators). Furthermore, the time and energy required
to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local
level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace.
See
Tenney, supra, at 377 (citing "the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial"). And the threat of
liability may significantly deter service in local government,
where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the
threat of civil liability. See
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,
457 U. S. 800,
816 (1982).
53
Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater
at the local level than at other levels of government.
Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitutional
violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are often
protected by sovereign immunity.
Lake Country Estates,
supra, at 405, n. 29 (citing
Monell v.
New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978)).
And, of course, the ultimate check on legislative abuse-the
electoral process-applies with equal force at the local level,
where legislators are often more closely responsible to the
electorate. Cf.
Tenney, supra, at 378 (stating that
"[s]elfdiscipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for
discouraging or correcting such abuses").
Any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not
extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by our opinion
in
Lake Country Estates. There, we held that members of an
interstate regional planning agency were entitled to absolute
legislative immunity. Bereft of any historical antecedent to the
regional agency, we relied almost exclusively on
Tenney's
description of the purposes of legislative immunity and the
importance of such immunity in advancing the "public good."
Although we expressly noted that local legislators were not at
issue in that case, see
Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at
404, n. 26, we considered the regional legislators at issue to be
the functional equivalents of local legislators, noting that the
regional agency was "comparable to a county or municipality" and
that the function of the regional agency, regulation of land use,
was "traditionallya function performed by local governments."
Id., at 401-402.5 Thus, we now make explicit what was
implicit
5 It is thus not surprising that several Members of this Court
have recognized that the rationale of
Lake Country Estates
essentially settled the question of immunity for local legislators.
See
Owen v.
Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 664, n. 6
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 407-408
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); see also
Spallone
v.
United States, 493
54
in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute
immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative
activities.
III
Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken "in
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."
Tenney,
supra, at 376. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners' conduct
in this case was not legislative because their actions were
specifically targeted at respondent. Relying on the jury's finding
that respondent's constitutionally protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor behind petitioners' conduct, the
court concluded that petitioners necessarily "relied on facts
relating to a particular individual" and "devised an ordinance that
targeted [respondent] and treated her differently from other
managers employed by the City." 134 F. 3d, at 441. Although the
Court of Appeals did not suggest that intent or motive can overcome
an immunity defense for activities that are, in fact, legislative,
the court erroneously relied on petitioners' subjective intent in
resolving the logically prior question of whether their acts were
legislative.
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act,
rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.
The privilege of absolute immunity "would be of little value if
[legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation
as to motives."
Ten-
u. S. 265, 278 (1990) (explaining that the same considerations
underlying
Tenney and
Lake Country Estates applied to
contempt sanctions against local legislators). In fact, the
argument for absolute immunity for local legislators may be
stronger than for the regional legislators in
Lake Country
Estates, because immunity was historically granted to local
legislators and because the legislators in
Lake Country
Estates were unelected and thus less directly accountable to
the public. See
Lake Country Estates, supra, at 407
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
55
ney, 341 U. S., at 377 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, it simply is "not consonant with our scheme
of government for a court to inquire into the motives of
legislators."
Ibid. We therefore held that the defendant in
Tenney had acted in a legislative capacity even though he
allegedly singled out the plaintiff for investigation in order "to
intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from
effectively exercising his constitutional rights."
Id., at
371 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of all
considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were
legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they were. Most
evidently, petitioner Roderick's acts of voting for an ordinance
were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan's
introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance also
were formally legislative, even though he was an executive
official. We have recognized that officials outside the legislative
branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform
legislative functions, see
Supreme Court of Va. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731-734
(1980); Bogan's actions were legislative because they were integral
steps in the legislative process. Cf.
Edwards v.
United
States, 286 U. S.
482, 490 (1932) (noting "the legislative character of the
President's function in approving or disapproving bills");
Smiley v.
Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 372-373
(1932) (recognizing that a Governor's signing or vetoing of a bill
constitutes part of the legislative process).
Respondent, however, asks us to look beyond petitioners' formal
actions to consider whether the ordinance was legislative in
substance. We need not determine whether the formally
legislative character of petitioners' actions is alone sufficient
to entitle petitioners to legislative immunity, because here the
ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional
legislation. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking
decision implicating the budgetary pri-
56
orities of the city and the services the city provides to its
constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position,
which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may
have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular
occupant of the office. And the city council, in eliminating DHHS,
certainly governed "in a field where legislators traditionally have
power to act."
Tenney, supra, at 379. Thus, petitioners'
activities were undoubtedly legislative.
***
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.6
It is so ordered.
6 Because of our conclusion that petitioners are entitled to
absolute legislative immunity, we need not address the third
question on which we granted certiorari: whether petitioners
proximately caused an injury cognizable under § 1983.
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