PER CURIAM
BOBBY V. VAN HOOK
558 U. S. ____ (2009)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID BOBBY, WARDEN
v. ROBERT J. VAN
HOOK
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 09–144. Decided November 9, 2009
Per Curiam.
The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief to Robert Van Hook on the
ground that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel
during the sentencing phase of his capital trial. Because we think
it clear that Van Hook’s attorneys met the constitutional minimum
of competence under the correct standard, we grant the petition and
reverse.
I
On February 18, 1985, Van Hook
went to a Cincinnati bar that catered to homosexual men, hoping to
find someone to rob. He approached David Self, and after the two
spent several hours drinking together they left for Self’s
apartment. There Van Hook “lured Self into a vulnerable position”
and attacked him, first strangling him until he was unconscious,
then killing him with a kitchen knife and mutilating his body.
State v.
Van Hook, 39 Ohio St. 3d 256, 256–257,
530 N. E. 2d 883, 884 (1988). Before fleeing with Self’s
valuables, Van Hook attempted to cover his tracks, stuffing the
knife and other items into the body and smearing fingerprints he
had left behind. Six weeks later, police found him in Florida,
where he confessed.
Van Hook was indicted in Ohio for
aggravated murder, with one capital specification, and aggravated
robbery. He waived his right to a jury trial, and a three-judge
panel found him guilty of both charges and the capital
specification. At the sentencing hearing, the defense called eight
mitigation witnesses, and Van Hook himself gave an unsworn
statement. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the trial court imposed the death penalty. The Ohio
courts affirmed on direct appeal,
id., at 265, 530
N. E. 2d, at 892;
State v.
Van Hook, No.
C–85–0565, 1987 WL 11202 (Ohio App., May 13, 1987)
(per
curiam), and we denied certiorari,
Van Hook v.
Ohio,
489
U. S. 1100 (1989). Van Hook also sought state postconviction
relief, which the Ohio courts denied.
State v.
Van
Hook, No. C–910505, 1992 WL 308350 (Ohio App., Oct. 21, 1992)
(per curiam), appeal denied, 66 Ohio St. 3d 1440, 608
N. E. 2d 1085, rehearing denied, 66 Ohio St. 3d 1470, 611
N. E. 2d 328 (1993);
State v.
Van Hook, 70
Ohio St. 3d 1216, 639 N. E. 2d 1199 (1994).
Van Hook filed this federal habeas petition in
1995. The District Court denied relief on all 17 of his claims.
Van Hook v.
Anderson, No. C–1–94–269 (SD Ohio,
Aug. 7, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a, 163a. A panel of the
Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Van Hook’s confession was
unconstitutionally obtained under
Edwards v.
Arizona,
451 U. S. 477 (1981).
See
Van Hook v.
Anderson, 444 F. 3d 830, 832
(2006). The en banc Sixth Circuit vacated that ruling, holding the
confession was proper, and it remanded the case to the panel to
consider Van Hook’s other claims. See
Van Hook v.
Anderson, 488 F. 3d 411, 428 (2007). Van Hook
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we denied.
Van
Hook v.
Hudson,
552 U. S. 1023
(2007).
On remand, the panel granted Van Hook habeas
relief again, but on different grounds, holding that his attorneys
were ineffective during the penalty phase because they did not
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, neglected
to secure an independent mental-health expert, and requested and
relied on a presentence investigation report without objecting to
damaging evidence it contained. See
Van Hook v.
Anderson, 535 F. 3d 458, 461 (2008). The en banc
Sixth Circuit again vacated the panel’s opinion, but rather than
hearing the case a second time it remanded for the panel to revise
its opinion. See
Van Hook v.
Anderson, 560
F. 3d 523, 524 (2009). In its third opinion, the panel—relying
on guidelines published by the American Bar Association (ABA) in
2003—granted relief to Van Hook on the sole ground that his lawyers
performed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating
evidence. See
id., at 525. The State petitioned for a writ
of certiorari. We grant the petition and reverse.
II
Because Van Hook filed his
federal habeas petition before April 24, 1996, the provisions of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 do not
apply. See
Lindh v.
Murphy,
521 U. S. 320, 327
(1997). Even without the Act’s added layer of deference to
state-court judgments, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that Van Hook is entitled to relief.
A
The Sixth Amendment entitles
criminal defendants to the “ ‘effective assistance of
counsel’ ”—that is, representation that does not fall “below
an objective standard of reasonableness” in light of “prevailing
professional norms.”
Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U. S. 668,
686 (1984) (quoting
McMann v.
Richardson,
397 U. S. 759,
771, n. 14 (1970)). That standard is necessarily a general
one. “No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced
by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant.” 466 U. S.
, at
688–689. Restatements of professional standards, we have
recognized, can be useful as “guides” to what reasonableness
entails, but only to the extent they describe the professional
norms prevailing when the representation took place.
Id.,
at 688.
The Sixth Circuit ignored this limiting
principle, relying on ABA guidelines announced 18 years after Van
Hook went to trial. See 560 F. 3d, at 526–528 (quoting ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases 10.7, comment., pp. 81–83 (rev. ed. 2003)).
The ABA standards in effect in 1985 described defense counsel’s
duty to investigate both the merits and mitigating circumstances in
general terms: “It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
penalty in the event of conviction.” 1 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice 4–4.1, p. 4–53 (2d ed. 1980). The accompanying two-page
commentary noted that defense counsel have “a substantial and
important role to perform in raising mitigating factors,” and that
“[i]nformation concerning the defendant’s background, education,
employment record, mental and emotional stability, family
relationships, and the like, will be relevant, as will mitigating
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense itself.”
Id., at 4–55.
Quite different are the ABA’s 131-page
“Guidelines” for capital defense counsel, published in 2003, on
which the Sixth Circuit relied. Those directives expanded what had
been (in the 1980 Standards) a broad outline of defense counsel’s
duties in all criminal cases into detailed prescriptions for legal
representation of capital defendants. They discuss the duty to
investigate mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail, specifying
what attorneys should look for, where to look, and when to begin.
See ABA Guidelines 10.7, comment., at 80–85. They include, for
example, the requirement that counsel’s investigation cover every
period of the defendant’s life from “the moment of conception,”
id., at 81, and that counsel contact “virtually
everyone … who knew [the defendant] and his family” and
obtain records “concerning not only the client, but also his
parents, grandparents, siblings, and children,”
id., at
83. Judging counsel’s conduct in the 1980’s on the basis of these
2003 Guidelines—without even pausing to consider whether they
reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time of the
trial—was error.
To make matters worse, the Court of Appeals
(following Circuit precedent) treated the ABA’s 2003 Guidelines not
merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do,
but as inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel
“ ‘must fully comply.’ ” 560 F. 3d, at 526 (quoting
Dickerson v.
Bagley, 453 F. 3d 690, 693 (CA6
2006)).
Strickland stressed, however, that “American Bar
Association standards and the like” are “only guides” to what
reasonableness means, not its definition. 466 U. S., at 688. We
have since regarded them as such.[
Footnote 1] See
Wiggins v.
Smith,
539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003). What we
have said of state requirements is
a fortiori true of
standards set by private organizations: “[W]hile States are free to
impose whatever specific rules they see fit to ensure that criminal
defendants are well represented, we have held that the Federal
Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make
objectively reasonable choices.”
Roe v.
Flores-Ortega,
528 U. S. 470, 479
(2000).
B
Van Hook insists that the Sixth
Circuit’s missteps made no difference because his counsel were
ineffective even under professional standards prevailing at the
time. He is wrong.
Like the Court of Appeals, Van
Hook first contends that his attorneys began their mitigation
investigation too late, waiting until he was found guilty—only days
before the sentencing hearing—to dig into his background. See 560
F. 3d, at 528. But the record shows they started much sooner.
Between Van Hook’s indictment and his trial less than three months
later, they contacted their lay witnesses early and often: They
spoke nine times with his mother (beginning within a week after the
indictment), once with both parents together, twice with an aunt
who lived with the family and often cared for Van Hook as a child,
and three times with a family friend whom Van Hook visited
immediately after the crime. App. to Pet. for Cert. 380a–383a,
384a–387a. As for their expert witnesses, they were in touch with
one more than a month before trial, and they met with the other for
two hours a week before the trial court reached its verdict.
Id., at 382a, 386a. Moreover, after reviewing his military
history, they met with a representative of the Veterans
Administration seven weeks before trial and attempted to obtain his
medical records.
Id., at 381a, 386a. And they looked into
enlisting a mitigation specialist when the trial was still five
weeks away.
Id., at 386a. The Sixth Circuit, in short, was
simply incorrect in saying Van Hook’s lawyers waited until the
“last minute.” 560 F. 3d, at 528. Cf.
Williams v.
Taylor,
529
U. S. 362, 395 (2000) (counsel waited “until a week before the
trial” to prepare for the sentencing phase).
Nor was the scope of counsel’s investigation
unreasonable.[
Footnote 2] The
Sixth Circuit said Van Hook’s attorneys found only “a little
information about his traumatic childhood experience,” 560
F. 3d, at 528, but that is a gross distortion. The trial court
learned, for instance, that Van Hook (whose parents were both
“heavy drinkers”) started drinking as a toddler, began “barhopping”
with his father at age 9, drank and used drugs regularly with his
father from age 11 forward, and continued abusing drugs and alcohol
into adulthood. App. to Pet. for Cert. 310a–312a, 323a–326a,
328a–330a, 373a. The court also heard that Van Hook grew up in a
“ ‘combat zone’ ”: He watched his father beat his mother
weekly, saw him hold her at gun- and knife-point, “observed”
episodes of “sexual violence” while sleeping in his parents’
bedroom, and was beaten himself at least once.
Id., at
321a, 338a–339a, 371a. It learned that Van Hook, who had “fantasies
about killing and war” from an early age, was deeply upset when his
drug and alcohol abuse forced him out of the military, and
attempted suicide five times (including a month before the murder),
id., at 351a–353a, 372a. And although the experts agreed
that Van Hook did not suffer from a “mental disease or defect,” the
trial court learned that Van Hook’s borderline personality disorder
and his consumption of drugs and alcohol the day of the crime
impaired “his ability to refrain from the [crime],”
id.,
at 303a, and that his “explo[sion]” of “senseless and bizarre
brutality” may have resulted from what one expert termed a
“homosexual panic,”
id., at 376a.
Despite all the mitigating evidence the
defense did present, Van Hook and the Court of Appeals fault his
counsel for failing to find more. What his counsel did discover,
the argument goes, gave them “reason to suspect that much worse
details existed,” and that suspicion should have prompted them to
interview other family members—his stepsister, two uncles, and two
aunts—as well as a psychiatrist who once treated his mother, all of
whom “could have helped his counsel narrate the true story of Van
Hook’s childhood experiences.” 560 F. 3d, at 528. But there
comes a point at which evidence from more distant relatives can
reasonably be expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it
distractive from more important duties. The ABA Standards
prevailing at the time called for Van Hook’s counsel to cover
several broad categories of mitigating evidence, see 1 ABA
Standards 4–4.1, comment., at 4–55, which they did. And given all
the evidence they unearthed from those closest to Van Hook’s
upbringing and the experts who reviewed his history, it was not
unreasonable for his counsel not to identify and interview every
other living family member or every therapist who once treated his
parents. This is not a case in which the defendant’s attorneys
failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared
them in the face, cf.
Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 525, or would
have been apparent from documents any reasonable attorney would
have obtained, cf.
Rompilla v.
Beard,
545 U. S. 374, 389–393
(2005). It is instead a case, like
Strickland itself, in
which defense counsel’s “decision not to seek more” mitigating
evidence from the defendant’s background “than was already in hand”
fell “well within the range of professionally reasonable
judgments.” 466 U. S., at 699.[
Footnote 3]
What is more, even if Van Hook’s counsel
performed deficiently by failing to dig deeper, he suffered no
prejudice as a result. See
id., at 694. As the Ohio court
that rejected Van Hook’s state habeas petition found, the
affidavits submitted by the witnesses not interviewed shows their
testimony would have added nothing of value. See
State v.
Van Hook, No. C–910505, 1992 WL 308350, *2. Only two
witnesses even arguably would have added new, relevant information:
One of Van Hook’s uncles noted that Van Hook’s mother was
temporarily committed to a psychiatric hospital, and Van Hook’s
stepsister mentioned that his father hit Van Hook frequently and
tried to kill Van Hook’s mother. App. to Pet. for Cert. 227a, 232a.
But the trial court had already heard—from Van Hook’s mother
herself—that she had been “under psychiatric care” more than once.
Id., at 340a. And it was already aware that his father had
a violent nature, had attacked Van Hook’s mother, and had beaten
Van Hook at least once. See also
id., at 305a (noting that
Van Hook “suffered from a significant degree of neglect and abuse”
throughout his “chaotic” childhood). Neither the Court of Appeals
nor Van Hook has shown why the minor additional details the trial
court did not hear would have made any difference.
On the other side of the scales, moreover, was
the evidence of the aggravating circumstance the trial court found:
that Van Hook committed the murder alone in the course of an
aggravated robbery. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.04(A)(7) (Lexis
2006). Van Hook’s confession made clear, and he never subsequently
denied, both that he was the sole perpetrator of the crime and that
“[h]is intention from beginning to end was to rob [Self] at some
point in their evening’s activities.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 295a;
see
id., at 276a–278a, 294a. Nor did he arrive at that
intention on a whim: Van Hook had previously pursued the same
strategy—of luring homosexual men into secluded settings to rob
them—many times since his teenage years, and he employed it again
even after Self’s murder in the weeks before his arrest. See
id., at 279a, 295a, 374a. Although Van Hook apparently
deviated from his original plan once the offense was underway—going
beyond stealing Self’s goods to killing him and disfiguring the
dead body—that hardly helped his cause. The Sixth Circuit, which
focused on the
number of aggravating factors instead of
their
weight, see 560 F. 3d, at 530; cf. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §2929.04(B), gave all this evidence short shrift, leading
it to overstate further the effect additional mitigating evidence
might have had.
* * *
The petition for certiorari and
the motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis are
granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
The narrow grounds for our opinion should not
be regarded as accepting the legitimacy of a less categorical use
of the Guidelines to evaluate post-2003 representation. For that to
be proper, the Guidelines must reflect “[p]revailing norms of
practice,”
Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, and “standard
practice,”
Wiggins v
. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003),
and must not be so detailed that they would “interfere with the
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions,”
Strickland,
supra, at 689. We express no views on
whether the 2003 Guidelines meet these criteria.
Footnote 2
In his brief in this Court, Van Hook also
alludes to his counsel’s failure to obtain an independent
mental-health expert and their reliance on (and failure to object
to harmful evidence in) a presentence investigation report—grounds
on which the Sixth Circuit panel previously relied but which it
abandoned in its final opinion. See
supra, at 2–3. Van
Hook now concedes, however, that neither ground is a “basis for
issuing the writ,” Brief in Opposition 5; see also
id., at
7, and accordingly we do not address them.
Footnote 3
In addition to the evidence the Sixth Circuit
said his attorneys overlooked, Van Hook alleges that his lawyers
failed to provide the expert witnesses with a “complete set of
relevant records or [his] complete psycho-social history.” Brief in
Opposition 4. But he offers no support for that assertion. He
further claims that his counsel failed to obtain or present records
of his military service and prior hospitalizations, but the record
shows that they did review the former, see App. to Pet. for Cert.
380a, and that the trial court learned (from one of the written
expert reports) all the relevant information Van Hook says it would
have gleaned from the latter, see
id., at 373a–377a.
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