OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
ANKENBRANDT, AS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER OF L. R., ET AL.
v. RICHARDS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 91-367. Argued March 31, 1992-Decided June 15, 1992
Petitioner brought this suit on behalf of her daughters in the
District Court, alleging federal jurisdiction based on the
diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U. S. C. § 1332, and
seeking monetary damages for alleged torts committed against the
girls by their father and his female companion, the respondents
here. The court granted respondents' motion to dismiss without
prejudice, ruling in the alternative that it lacked jurisdiction
because the case fell within the "domestic relations" exception to
diversity jurisdiction and that its decision to dismiss was
justified under the abstention principles announced in
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. A domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction exists as a matter of statutory construction. Pp.
693-701.
(a) The exception stems from
Barber v.
Barber, 21
How. 582, 584, in which the Court announced in dicta, without
citation of authority or discussion of foundation, that federal
courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance
of alimony. The lower federal courts have ever since recognized a
limitation on their jurisdiction based on that statement, and this
Court is unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has
existed for nearly a century and a half. Pp. 693-695.
(b) An examination of Article III, § 2, of the Constitution and
of
Barber and its progeny makes clear that the Constitution
does not mandate the exclusion of domestic relations cases from
federal-court jurisdiction. Rather, the origins of the exception
lie in the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
De
la Rama v.
De la Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 307. Pp.
695-697.
(c) That the domestic relations exception exists is demonstrated
by the inclusion of the defining phrase, "all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity," in the pre-1948 versions of the
diversity statute, by
Barber's implicit interpretation of
that phrase to exclude divorce and alimony actions, and by
Congress' silent acceptance of this construction for nearly a
century. Considerations of
stare decisis have particular
strength in this context, where the legislative power is
implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what this Court has
done.
Patterson v.
690
Syllabus
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164,172-173.
Furthermore, it may be presumed that Congress amended the diversity
statute in 1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with § 1332's
"all civil actions" phrase with full cognizance of the Court's
longstanding interpretation of the prior statutes, and that, absent
any indication of an intent to the contrary, Congress adopted that
interpretation in reenacting the statute. pp. 697-70l.
2. The domestic relations exception does not permit a district
court to refuse to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a tort
action for damages. The exception, as articulated by this Court
since
Barber, encompasses only cases involving the issuance
of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. As so limited, the
exception's validity must be reaffirmed, given the long passage of
time without any expression of congressional dissatisfaction and
sound policy considerations of judicial economy and expertise.
Because this lawsuit in no way seeks a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree, the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the
District Court's invocation of the domestic relations exception.
Federal subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 is proper in
this case. Pp. 701-704.
3. The District Court erred in abstaining from exercising
jurisdiction under the
Younger doctrine. Although this Court
has extended
Younger abstention to the civil context, it has
never applied the notions of comity so critical to
Younger
where, as here, no proceeding was pending in state tribunals.
Similarly, while it is not inconceivable that in certain
circumstances the abstention principles developed in
Burford
v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, might be
relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship
even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child
custody, such abstention is inappropriate here, where the status of
the domestic relationship has been determined as a matter of state
law, and in any event has no bearing on the underlying torts
alleged. Pp. 704-706.
934 F.2d
1262, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 707. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined,
post, p. 717.
Richard Ducote argued the cause and filed a brief for
petitioner.
691
Paul Weidenfeld argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief was
Samuel S.
Dalton. *
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether the federal courts have
jurisdiction or should abstain in a case involving alleged torts
committed by the former husband of petitioner and his female
companion against petitioner's children, when the sole basis for
federal jurisdiction is the diversity-ofcitizenship provision of 28
U. S. C. § 1332.
I
Petitioner Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, brought
this lawsuit on September 26, 1989, on behalf of her daughters L.
R. and S. R. against respondents Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler,
citizens of Louisiana, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Alleging federal jurisdiction based
on the diversity-ofcitizenship provision of § 1332, Ankenbrandt's
complaint sought monetary damages for alleged sexual and physical
abuse of the children committed by Richards and Kesler. Richards is
the divorced father of the children and Kesler his female
companion.1 On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted
respondents' motion to dismiss this lawsuit.
*Marcia Robinson Lowry, Steven R. Shapiro, and
John A.
Powell filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
1 Ankenbrandt represents that in the month prior to the filing
of this federal-court action, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court
in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, entered a judgment under the
State's child protection laws, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1600
et
seq. (West 1983), repealed, 1991 La. Acts, No. 235, § 17, eff.
Jan. 1, 1992, and superseded by Louisiana Children's Code, Title X,
Art. 1001
et seq. (1991), permanently terminating all of
Richards' parental rights because of the alleged abuse and
permanently enjoining him from any contact with the children.
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found it
necessary to pass on the accuracy of this representation in
resolving the issues presented; nor do we.
692
Citing
In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593-594
(1890), for the proposition that "[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States," the court concluded that this case fell within what has
become known as the "domestic relations" exception to diversity
jurisdiction, and that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. The
court also invoked the abstention principles announced in
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), to
justify its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
No. 894244 (ED La., Dec. 10, 1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed
in an unpublished opinion. No. 91-3037 (CA5, May 31, 1991), judgt.
order reported at
934 F.2d
1262.
We granted certiorari limited to the following questions: "(1)
Is there a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction?
(2) If so, does it permit a district court to abstain from
exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for damages?"
2 and "(3) Did the District Court in this case err in abstaining
from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine
2 The Courts of Appeals have generally diverged in cases
involving application of the domestic relations exception to tort
suits brought in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.
See,
e. g., Bennett v.
Bennett, 221 U. S. App. D. C.
90,
682 F.2d
1039 (1982) (holding that the exception does not bar a claim
for damages but that it does bar claims for injunctive relief);
Cole v.
Cole, 633 F.2d
1083 (CA4 1980) (holding that the exception does not
apply in tort suits stemming from custody and visitation disputes);
Drewes v.
Ilnicki, 863 F.2d
469 (CA6 1988) (holding that the exception does not
apply to a tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional
distress);
Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694
F.2d 489 (CA7 1982) (holding that the exception does not
apply to a tort claim for interference with the custody of a
child);
McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 771
F.2d 1316 (CA9 1985) (holding that the exception does
not apply when the case does not involve questions of parental
status, interference with pending state domestic relations
proceedings, an alteration of a state-court judgment, or the
impingement of the state court's supervision of a minor);
Ingram v.
Hayes, 866 F.2d
368 (CAll 1988) (holding that the exception applies to divest a
federal court of jurisdiction over a tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
693
of
Younger v.
Harris?" 502 U. S. 1023 (1992). We
address each of these issues in turn.
II
The domestic relations exception upon which the courts below
relied to decline jurisdiction has been invoked often by the lower
federal courts. The seeming authority for doing so originally
stemmed from the announcement in
Barber v.
Barber, 21
How. 582 (1859), that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over
suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony. In that case, the
Court heard a suit in equity brought by a wife (by her next friend)
in Federal District Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction
against her former husband. She sought to enforce a decree from a
New York state court, which had granted a divorce and awarded her
alimony. The former husband thereupon moved to Wisconsin to place
himself beyond the New York courts' jurisdiction so that the
divorce decree there could not be enforced against him; he then
sued for divorce in a Wisconsin court, representing to that court
that his wife had abandoned him and failing to disclose the
existence of the New York decree. In a suit brought by the former
wife in Wisconsin Federal District Court, the former husband
alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction. The court accepted
jurisdiction and gave judgment for the divorced wife.
On appeal, it was argued that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that there was no diversity of
citizenship because although divorced, the wife's citizenship
necessarily remained that of her former husband; and second, that
the whole subject of divorce and alimony, including a suit to
enforce an alimony decree, was exclusively ecclesiastical at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution and that the Constitution
therefore placed the whole subject of divorce and alimony beyond
the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Over the dissent of
three Justices, the Court rejected both arguments. After an
exhaustive survey of
694
the authorities, the Court concluded that a divorced wife could
acquire a citizenship separate from that of her former husband and
that a suit to enforce an alimony decree rested within the federal
courts' equity jurisdiction. The Court reached these conclusions
after summarily dismissing the former husband's contention that the
case involved a subject matter outside the federal courts'
jurisdiction. In so stating, however, the Court also announced the
following limitation on federal jurisdiction:
"Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remembered-that this
is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony. That
has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court in
Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from being
defeated by fraud.
"We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of
alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an
incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and
board." Barber, supra, at 584.
As a general matter, the dissenters agreed with these
statements, but took issue with the Court's holding that the
instant action to enforce an alimony decree was within the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The statements disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce and alimony
decree suits, though technically dicta, formed the basis for
excluding "domestic relations" cases from the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts, a jurisdictional limitation those courts have
recognized ever since. The
Barber Court, however, cited no
authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement.
Since that time, the Court has dealt only occasionally with the
domestic relations limitation on federal-court jurisdiction, and it
has never addressed the basis for such a limitation. Because we are
unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been recognized
for nearly
695
a century and a half, we feel compelled to explain why we will
continue to recognize this limitation on federal jurisdiction.
A
Counsel argued in
Barber that the Constitution prohibited
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over domestic relations
cases. Brief for Appellant in
Barber v.
Barber, D. T.
1858, No. 44, pp. 4-5. An examination of Article III,
Barber
itself, and our cases since
Barber makes clear that the
Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases from the
jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the federal
courts.
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
"Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
This section delineates the absolute limits on the federal
courts' jurisdiction. But in articulating three different terms to
define jurisdiction-"Cases, in Law and Equity," "Cases," and
"Controversies"-this provision contains no limitation on subjects
of a domestic relations nature. Nor did
Barber purport to
ground the domestic relations exception in these constitutional
limits on federal jurisdiction. The Court's discussion of federal
judicial power to hear suits
696
of a domestic relations nature contains no mention of the
Constitution, see
Barber, 21 How., at 584, and it is logical
to presume that the Court based its statement limiting such power
on narrower statutory, rather than broader constitutional, grounds.
Cf.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida
Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council,
485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).
Subsequent decisions confirm that
Barber was not relying
on constitutional limits in justifying the exception. In one such
case, for instance, the Court stated the "long established rule"
that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain domestic
relations matters as having been based on the assumptions that
"husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States,
so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been
somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that
a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value."
De la
Rama v.
De la Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 307
(1906). Since Article III contains no monetary limit on suits
brought pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction,
De la
Rama's articulation of the "rule" in terms of the statutory
requirements for diversity jurisdiction further supports the view
that the exception is not grounded in the Constitution.
Moreover, even while citing with approval the
Barber
language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over domestic relations matters, the Court has heard appeals from
territorial courts involving divorce, see,
e. g.,
De la Rama, supra; Simms v.
Simms, 175 U. S. 162 (1899), and
has upheld the exercise of original jurisdiction by federal courts
in the District of Columbia to decide divorce actions, see,
e.
g., Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 581, n. 54
(1962). Thus, even were the statements in
De la Rama
referring to the statutory prerequisites of diversity jurisdiction
alone not persuasive testament to the statutory origins of the
rule, by hearing appeals from legislative, or Article I, courts,
this Court implicitly has made clear its understanding
697
that the source of the constraint on jurisdiction from
Barber was
not Article III; otherwise the Court
itself would have lacked jurisdiction over appeals from these
legislative courts. See
National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 643 (1949) (Vinson,
C. J., dissenting) ("We can no more review a legislative court's
decision of a case which is not among those enumerated in Art. III
than we can hear a case from a state court involving purely state
law questions"). We therefore have no difficulty concluding that
when the
Barber Court "disclaim[ed] altogether any
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce," 21 How., at 584, it was not basing its statement on the
Constitution.3
B
That Article III, § 2, does not mandate the exclusion of
domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction, however,
does not mean that such courts necessarily must retain and exercise
jurisdiction over such cases. Other constitutional provisions
explain why this is so. Article I, § 8, cl. 9, for example,
authorizes Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court" and Article III, § 1, states that "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." The Court's cases state the rule that "if
inferior federal courts were created, [Congress was not] required
to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to
bestow under Art. IlL"
Palmore v.
United States,
411 U. S. 389,
401 (1973).
3We read
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler, 280 U. S. 379 (1930), as
in accord with this conclusion. In that case, the Court referenced
the language in
In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890),
regarding the domestic relations exception and then held that a
state court was not precluded by the Constitution and relevant
federal statutes from exercising jurisdiction over a divorce suit
brought against the Roumanian vice-consul. See 280 U. S., at
383-384.
698
This position has held constant since at least 1845, when the
Court stated that "the judicial power of the United States ... is
(except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this
Court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the
modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court) ... and of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may
seem proper for the public good."
Cary v.
Curtis, 3
How. 236, 245. See
Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441
(1850);
Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v.
Henderson,
170 U. S. 511
(1898);
Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922);
Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 (1943). We thus
turn our attention to the relevant jurisdictional statutes.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "the circuit courts
shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of
all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of
costs, the sum or value of
five hundred dollars, and ... an
alien is a party, or the suit is
between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (emphasis added). The defining
phrase, "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,"
remained a key element of statutory provisions demarcating the
terms of diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress amended
the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this phrase and
replace in its stead the term "all civil actions." 1948 Judicial
Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28 U. S. C. § 1332.
The
Barber majority itself did not expressly refer to the
diversity statute's use of the limitation on "suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity." The dissenters in
Barber, however, implicitly made such a reference, for they
suggested that the federal courts had no power over certain
699
domestic relations actions because the court of chancery lacked
authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees. Stating that "[t]he
origin and the extent of [the federal courts'] jurisdiction must be
sought in the laws of the United States, and in the settled rules
and principles by which those laws have bound them," the dissenters
contended that "as the jurisdiction of the chancery in England does
not extend to or embrace the subjects of divorce and alimony, and
as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in chancery
is bounded by that of the chancery in England, all power or
cognizance with respect to those subjects by the courts of the
United States
in chancery is equally excluded."
Barber, 21 How., at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Hence, in
the dissenters' view, a suit seeking such relief would not fall
within the statutory language "all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity." Because the
Barber Court did not
disagree with this reason for accepting the
jurisdictionallimitation over the issuance of divorce and alimony
decrees, it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional
limitation recognized by the Court rested on this statutory basis
and that the disagreement between the Court and the dissenters thus
centered only on the extent of the limitation.
We have no occasion here to join the historical debate over
whether the English court of chancery had jurisdiction to handle
certain domestic relations matters, though we note that
commentators have found some support for the
Barber
majority's interpretation.4 Certainly it was not unprecedented at
the time for the Court to infer, from what it under-
4 See,
e. g., Vestal & Foster, Implied
Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1956); Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in
Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35
Hastings L. J. 571, 584-589 (1984); Rush, Domestic Relations Law:
Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception
to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1824, 1834-1839
(1983); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity
Jurisdiction: ARe-Evaluation, 24 Boston College L. Rev. 661,
664-668 (1983).
700
stood to be English chancery practice, some guide to the meaning
of the 1789 Act's jurisdictional grant. See,
e. g.,
Robinson v.
Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 221-222 (1818).
We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a domestic
relations exception exists as a matter of statutory construction
not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on which it
was seemingly based, but rather on Congress' apparent acceptance of
this construction of the diversity jurisdiction provisions in the
years prior to 1948, when the statute limited jurisdiction to
"suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." As the court
in
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim &
Ballon v.
Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d
509, 514 (CA2 1973), observed: "More than a century has elapsed
since the
Barber dictum without any intimation of
Congressional dissatisfaction .... Whatever Article III mayor may
not permit, we thus accept the
Barber dictum as a correct
interpretation of the Congressional grant." Considerations of
stare decisis have particular strength in this context,
where "the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done."
Patterson v.
McLean
Credit Union, 491
U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989).
When Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948 to replace
the law/equity distinction with the phrase "all civil actions," we
presume Congress did so with full cognizance of the Court's nearly
century-long interpretation of the prior statutes, which had
construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an
exception for certain domestic relations matters. With respect to
the 1948 amendment, the Court has previously stated that "no
changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of
language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is
clearly expressed."
Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra
Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227
(1957); see also
Finley v.
United States, 490 U. S. 545, 554
(1989). With respect to such a longstanding and well-known
construction of the diversity statute, and where Congress made
substantive changes to the statute in other
701
respects, see 28 U. S. C. § 1332 note, we presume, absent any
indication that Congress intended to alter this exception, see
ibid.; Advisory Committee's Note 3 to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
2, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 555, that Congress "adopt[ed] that
interpretation" when it reenacted the diversity statute.
Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580
(1978).5
III
In the more than 100 years since this Court laid the seeds for
the development of the domestic relations exception, the lower
federal courts have applied it in a variety of circumstances. See,
e. g., cases cited in n. 1,
supra. Many of
these applications go well beyond the circumscribed situations
posed by
Barber and its progeny.
Barber itself
disclaimed federal jurisdiction over a narrow range of domestic
relations issues involving the granting of a divorce and a decree
of alimony, see 21 How., at 584, and stated the limits on
federalcourt power to intervene prior to the rendering of such
orders:
"It is, that when a court of competent jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and the parties decrees a divorce, and alimony to
the wife as its incident, and is unable of itself to enforce the
decree summarily upon the husband, that courts of equity will
interfere to prevent the decree from being defeated by fraud. The
interference, however, is limited to cases in which alimony has
been decreed; then only to the extent of what is due, and always to
cases in which no appeal is pending from the decree for the divorce
or for alimony." Id., at 591.
The
Barber Court thus did not intend to strip the federal
courts of authority to hear cases arising from the domestic
5JU8TICE BLACKMUN criticizes us for resting upon Congress'
apparent acceptance of the Court's earlier construction of the
diversity statute in the 1948 codification. See
post, at
708-709 (opinion concurring in judgment). We see nothing remarkable
in this decision. See,
e. g., Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.
S. 258, 283-284 (1972).
702
relations of persons unless they seek the granting or
modification of a divorce or alimony decree. The holding of the
case itself sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
the enforcement of an alimony decree that had been properly
obtained in a state court of competent jurisdiction. Contrary to
the
Barber dissenters' position, the enforcement of such
validly obtained orders does not "regulate the domestic relations
of society" and produce an "inquisitorial authority" in which
federal tribunals "enter the habitations and even into the chambers
and nurseries of private families, and inquire into and pronounce
upon the morals and habits and affections or antipathies of the
members of every household."
Id., at 602 (Daniel, J.,
dissenting). And from the conclusion that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to issue divorce and alimony decrees, there was no
dissent. See
id., at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[u]pon questions of settlement or of contract connected with
marriages, the court of chancery will undertake the enforcement of
such contracts, but does not decree alimony as such, and
independently of such contracts"). See also
Simms v.
Simms, 175 U. S., at 167 (stating that "[i]t may therefore
be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of
claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an
original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such alimony in
a state court").
Subsequently, this Court expanded the domestic relations
exception to include decrees in child custody cases. In a child
custody case brought pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, for
instance, the Court held void a writ issued by a Federal District
Court to restore a child to the custody of the father. "As to the
right to the control and possession of this child, as it is
contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to
which neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority
of the United States has any special jurisdiction."
In re
Burrus, 136 U. S., at 594.
703
Although
In re Burrus technically did not involve a
construction of the diversity statute, as we understand
Barber to have done, its statement that "[t]he whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States,"
id., at 593-594, has been interpreted by the
federal courts to apply with equal vigor in suits brought pursuant
to diversity jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Bennett
v.
Bennett, 221 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93,
682 F.2d
1039, 1042
(1982); Solomon v.
Solomon, 516 F.2d
1018, 1025 (CA3 1975);
Hernstadt v.
Hernstadt,
373 F.2d
316, 317 (CA2 1967); see generally 13B C. Wright, A. Miller,
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3609, pp.
477-479, nn. 28-32 (1984). This application is consistent with
Barber's directive to limit federal courts' exercise of
diversity jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony decrees.
See
Barber, 21 How., at 584.6 We conclude, therefore, that
the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court
since
Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given the long passage
of time without any expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we
have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of the exception as
it pertains to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody
orders.
Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for this longheld
understanding, it is also supported by sound policy considerations.
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves
retention of jurisdiction by the court and
6 The better reasoned views among the Courts of Appeals have
similarly stated the domestic relations exception as narrowly
confined to suits for divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees.
See,
e. g., McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 771
F. 2d, at 1317 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("[T]he exception to
jurisdiction arises in those cases where a federal court is asked
to grant a decree of divorce or annulment, or to grant custody or
fix payments for support");
Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694 F.
2d, at 492 (same);
Bennett v.
Bennett, 221 U. S. App.
D.
C., at 93, 682 F. 2d, at 1042 (same);
Cole v.
Cole, 633 F. 2d, at 1087 (same).
704
deployment of social workers to monitor compliance. As a matter
of judicial economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work
of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close
association with state and local government organizations dedicated
to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter of
judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that
federal courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because
of the special proficiency developed by state tribunals over the
past century and a half in handling issues that arise in the
granting of such decrees. See
Lloyd v.
Loeffler,
694 F.2d
489,492 (CA7 1982).
By concluding, as we do, that the domestic relations exception
encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce,
alimony, or child custody decree, we necessarily find that the
Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District Court's invocation
of this exception. This lawsuit in no way seeks such a decree;
rather, it alleges that respondents Richards and Kesler committed
torts against L. R. and S. R., Ankenbrandt's children by Richards.
Federal subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 thus is
proper in this case.7 We now address whether, even though
subjectmatter jurisdiction might be proper, sufficient grounds
exist to warrant abstention from the exercise of that
jurisdiction.
IV
The Court of Appeals, as did the District Court, stated
abstention as an alternative ground for its holding. The District
Court quoted another federal court to the effect that
"'[aJbstention, that doctrine designed to promote federalstate
comity, is required when to render a decision would
7 The courts below offered no explanation, and we are aware of
none, why the domestic relations exception applies at all to
respondent Kesler, who would appear to stand in the same position
with respect to Ankenbrandt as any other opponent in a tort suit
brought in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.
705
disrupt the establishment of a coherent state policy.'" App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-6 (quoting
Zaubi v.
Hoejme, 530 F.
Supp. 831, 836 (WD Pa. 1980)). It is axiomatic, however, that
"[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the
exception, not the rule."
Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800, 813
(1976). Abstention rarely should be invoked, because the federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the
jurisdiction given them."
Id., at 817.
The courts below cited
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), to
support their holdings to abstain in this case. In so doing, the
courts clearly erred.
Younger itself held that, absent
unusual circumstances, a federal court could not interfere with a
pending state criminal prosecution.
Id., at 54. Though we
have extended
Younger abstention to the civil context, see,
e. g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar
Assn., 457 U. S.
423 (1982);
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619 (1986);
Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1 (1987), we have
never applied the notions of comity so critical to
Younger's
"Our Federalism" when no state proceeding was pending nor any
assertion of important state interests made. In this case, there is
no allegation by respondents of any pending state proceedings, and
Ankenbrandt contends that such proceedings ended prior to her
filing this lawsuit. Absent any
pending proceeding in state
tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts of
Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.
It is not inconceivable, however, that in certain circumstances,
the abstention principles developed in
Burford v.
Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S.
315 (1943), might be relevant in a case involving elements of
the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek
divorce, alimony, or child custody. This would be so when a case
presents "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case
706
then at bar."
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.,
supra, at 814. Such might well be the case if a federal suit
were filed prior to effectuation of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree, and the suit depended on a determination of the
status of the parties. Where, as here, the status of the domestic
relationship has been determined as a matter of state law, and in
any event has no bearing on the underlying torts alleged, we have
no difficulty concluding that
Burford abstention is
inappropriate in this case.8
V
We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming
the District Court's rulings to decline jurisdiction based on the
domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction and to
abstain under the doctrine of
Younger v.
Harris,
supra. The exception has no place in a suit such as this one,
in which a former spouse sues another on behalf of children alleged
to have been abused. Because the allegations in this complaint do
not request the District Court to issue a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree, we hold that the
8 Moreover, should
Burford abstention be relevant in
other circumstances, it may be appropriate for the court to retain
jurisdiction to ensure prompt and just disposition of the matter
upon the determination by the state court of the relevant issue.
Cf.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W S.
Ranch
Co., 391 U. S.
593, 594 (1968).
Though he acknowledges that our earlier cases invoking the
domestic relations exceptions speak in jurisdictional terms,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN nevertheless would reinterpret them to support a
special abstention doctrine for such cases. See
post, at
713-716 (opinion concurring in judgment). Yet in briefly sketching
his vision of how such a doctrine might operate, JUSTICE BLACKMUN
offers no authoritative support for where such an abstention
doctrine might be found, no principled reason why we should
retroactively concoct an abstention doctrine out of whole cloth to
account for federal court practice in existence for 82 years prior
to the announcement of the first abstention doctrine in
Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), and
no persuasive reason why articulation of such an abstention
doctrine offers a sounder way of achieving the same result than our
construction of the statute.
707
suit is appropriate for the exercise of § 1332 jurisdiction
given the existence of diverse citizenship between petitioner and
respondents and the pleading of the relevant amount in controversy.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the District Court had jurisdiction
over petitioner's claims in tort. Moreover, I agree that the
federal courts should not entertain claims for divorce, alimony,
and child custody. I am unable to agree, however, that the
diversity statute contains any "exception" for domestic relations
matters. The Court goes to remarkable lengths to craft an exception
that is simply not in the statute and is not supported by the case
law. In my view, the longstanding, unbroken practice of the federal
courts in refusing to hear domestic relations cases is precedent at
most for continued discretionary abstention rather than mandatory
limits on federal jurisdiction. For these reasons I concur only in
the Court's judgment.
I
The Court holds that the diversity statute contains an
"exception" for cases seeking the issuance of a divorce, alimony,
or child custody decree.
Ante, at 701-704. Yet no such
exception appears in the statute. The diversity statute is not
ambiguous at all. It extends the jurisdiction of the district
courts to
"all civil actions" between diverse parties
involving the requisite amount in controversy. 28 U. S. C. § 1332
(emphasis added).
This Court has recognized that in the absence of a "clearly
expressed" intention to the contrary, the language of the statute
itself is ordinarily "conclusive." See,
e. g.,
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U. S.
708
BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment
102, 108 (1980). The Court apparently discovers in the history
of the diversity statute and this Court's own case law a clearly
expressed intention contrary to the words of the statute. First,
the Court observes that the diversity statute formerly extended
only to "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity"
rather than to "all civil actions."
Ante, at 698. Then the
Court interprets this Court's decision in
Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859), to read into this "common law or
equity" limitation an exclusion of matters, such as actions for
divorce and alimony, that were not cognizable in the English courts
of common law and equity.
Ante, at 698-699. The Court points
to what it regards as Congress' "apparent acceptance" of this
construction of the diversity statute.
Ante, at 700.
Finally, notwithstanding Congress' replacement in 1948 of the
"common law and equity" limitation with the phrase "all civil
actions," the Court considers this to be evidence that Congress
adopted the prior "well-known construction" of the diversity
statute.
Ibid.
I have great difficulty with the Court's approach. Starting at
the most obvious point, I do not see how a language change that, if
anything, expands the jurisdictional scope of the statute can be
said to constitute evidence of approval of a prior narrow
construction.1 Any inaction on the part of Congress in 1948 in
failing expressly to mention domestic relations matters in the
diversity statute reflects the fact, as is discussed below, that
Congress likely had no idea until the
1 To be sure, this modification in language was part of a
wholesale revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, and this Court has
recognized that "no changes of law or policy are to be presumed
from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make
such changes is clearly expressed."
Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227
(1957); see
Finley v.
United States, 490 U. S. 545, 554
(1989). This principle may negate an inference that the change in
language expanded the scope of the statute, but it does not
affirmatively authorize an inference that Congress' recodification
was designed to approve of prior constructions of the statute.
709
Court's decision today that the diversity statute contained an
exception for domestic relations matters.
This leads to my primary concern: the Court's conclusion that
Congress understood
Barber as an interpretation of the
diversity statute.
Barber did not express any intent to
construe the diversity statute-clearly,
Barber "cited no
authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement"
disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce and alimony matters.
Ante, at 694. As the Court puts it, it may only be
"inferred" that the basis for declining jurisdiction was the
diversity statute.
Ante, at 699. It is inferred not from
anything in the
Barber majority opinion. Rather, it is
inferred from the comments of a dissenting Justice and the absence
of rebuttal by the
Barber majority.
Ante, at 699.2
The Court today has a difficult enough time arriving at this
unlikely interpretation of the
Barber decision. I cannot
imagine that Congress ever assembled this construction on its
own.
In any event, at least three subsequent decisions of this Court
seriously undermine any inference that
Barber's recognition
of a domestic relations "exception" traces to a "common law or
equity" limitation of the diversity statute. In
Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.
S. 162 (1899), the Court heard an appeal by a husband from the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona affirming the territorial
District Court's dismissal of his bill for divorce and its award to
his wife of alimony and counsel fees
pendente lite. The wife
sought dismissal of the appeal to this Court because the suit
involved domestic relations. In contrast to
Barber, the
Court
2 Moreover, as the Court intimates,
ante, at 699, and n.
4, there is good reason to question the
Barber dissent's
interpretation of English practice. The historical evidence, while
not unequivocal, suggests that the English chancery courts did in
fact exercise some jurisdiction over matrimonial matters. See,
e. g., Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694 F.2d
489, 491-492
(CA7 1982); Spindel v.
Spindel, 283
F. Supp. 797,802-803,806-809 (EDNY 1968); Atwood, Domestic
Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of
Jurisdiction, 35 Hastings L. J. 571,584-585 (1984).
710
BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment
undertook an extensive review and discussion of the statutory
bases for its jurisdiction over the appeal. It expressly recognized
that its appellate jurisdiction was confined to "those cases, and
those cases only,
at law or in equity." 175 U. S., at 167
(emphasis added).3 Nevertheless, the Court in
Simms did not
find the "common law or equity" limitation to be a bar to
jurisdiction.4 The Court distinguished
Barber, not on
grounds that the jurisdictional statute in
Barber was
limited to cases in law and equity while that in
Simms was
not-indeed, it could not be so distinguished. The Court
distinguished
Barber on grounds that it involved domestic
relations matters in the States rather than in the Territories. It
reasoned that the whole subject of domestic relations "belongs to
the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States,"
while "[i]n the Territories of the United States, Congress has the
entire dominion and sovereignty, national and local." 175 U. S., at
167-168. Today the Court infers an interpretation of
Barber
that the Court in
Simms plainly rejected.
The second decision undermining the Court's interpretation of
Barber is
De la Rama v.
De la Rama, 201 U. S. 303 (1906), in
which the Court took jurisdiction over an appeal
3 The Court stated:
"[T]he appellate jurisdiction of this court to review and
reverse or affirm the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme
Court of a Territory includes those cases, and those cases only, at
law or in equity, in which 'the matter in dispute, exclusive of
costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.' " 175 U. S.,
at 167.
See also
id., at 166 (citing the Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch.
355, 23 Stat. 443, limiting appellate jurisdiction from the
territorial courts to "any suit at law or in equity").
4 The Court concluded it could not review the question of
divorce, because it involved "no matter of law, but mere questions
of fact" and because, contrary to the statutory
amount-in-controversy requirement, it involved "a matter the value
of which could not be estimated in money." 175 U. S., at 168-169.
It modified and affirmed the alimony award.
Id., at 172.
711
from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a wife's
action for divorce and alimony. Citing
Barber, De la Rama
explained the historical reasons that federal courts have not
exercised jurisdiction over actions for divorce and alimony. The
"common law or equity" limitation the Court now finds so
significant was not among those reasons.5 This was so even though
the appellate jurisdictional statute at issue there extended to
"all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings," 32 Stat. 695,
opening the door for the Court easily to have distinguished
Barber on the grounds of the "common law or equity"
limitation in the diversity statute. Instead, explicitly
reaffirming the grounds relied upon in
Simms for
distinguishing
Barber, the Court pointed to the absence of
any need to defer to the States' regulation of the area of domestic
relations in the context of an appeal from a nonstate, territorial
court. 201 U. S., at 308.
The third decision is
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler,
280 U. S. 379 (1930). In
Popovici, a Roumanian vice
consul was sued by his wife in an Ohio state court for a divorce
and alimony. He defended by claiming that the Ohio state court had
no jurisdiction to grant the divorce, because federal statutes
granted
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts of
"'all suits and proceedings against ... consuls or viceconsuls'"
and" 'all suits against consuls and vice-consuls.'"
5 The Court in
De la Rama justified the exception "both
by reason of fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be
citizens of different States, so long as the marriage relation
continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases),
and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself
involves no pecuniary value." 201 U. S., at 307. The first reason
obviously was discounted by
De la Rama itself and is of
course untenable today. The second reason can apply only to
nonmonetary divorce actions but not to actions for alimony above
the amount-incontroversy limitation. The second reason, moreover,
was disclaimed by
De la Rama itself in joint divorce and
alimony actions.
Id., at 310. At any rate, in view of
De
la Rama's explanation, surely the Court is mistaken when it
states it "has never addressed the basis" for the domestic
relations exception.
Ante, at 694.
712
BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment
Id., at 382-383 (quoting the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch.
231, 36 Stat. 1161, 1093). Rejecting this claim, Justice Holmes
observed for a unanimous Court that the jurisdictional statutes "do
not affect the present case if it be true as has been unquestioned
for three-quarters of a century that the Courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction over divorce." 280 U. S., at 383. The
Court traced this absence of jurisdiction not to the diversity
statute but apparently to the Constitution itself:
"If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding
was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and
child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty
in construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing
with the statutes. 'Suits against consuls and vice-consuls' must be
taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to include
what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts."
Id., at 383-384.
I think it implausible to believe that, especially after
Popovici, Congress could be said to have accepted this
Court's decision in
Barber as simply a construction of the
diversity statute. 6 Accordingly, the Court is without a requisite
foundation for ratifying what Congress intended. Cf.
Flood
v.
Kuhn, 407
U. S. 258, 283-284 (1972) (declining to overturn
6 The Court claims that "by hearing appeals from legislative, or
Article I, courts, this Court implicitly has made clear its
understanding that the source of the constraint on jurisdiction
from
Barber was
not Article III; otherwise the Court
itself would have lacked jurisdiction over appeals from these
legislative courts."
Ante, at 696-697. The Court, however,
overlooks the rule that "[w]hen questions of jurisdiction have been
passed on in prior decisions
sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings
the jurisdictional issue before us."
Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.
S. 528, 535, n. 5 (1974); see
Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 119 (1984).
This Court has never understood the rule differently.
United
States v.
More, 3 Cranch 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall, C.
J.) (statement at oral argument).
713
prior precedent
explicitly exempting professional
baseball from antitrust laws where Congress "by its positive
inaction" has allowed prior decisions to stand).
Even assuming the Court today correctly interprets
Barber, its extension of any domestic relations "exception"
to the diversity statute for child custody matters is not warranted
by any known principles of statutory construction. The Court relies
on
In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890), in
which the Court denied the "jurisdiction" of a Federal District
Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in favor of a father to
recover the care and custody of his child from the child's
grandfather. That case did not involve the diversity statute, but
rather the habeas corpus statute, and the Court expressly declined
to address the diversity statute.7
Id., at 597. To the Court
today this is just a "technica[l]" distinction.
Ante, at
703. I find it germane, because, to the best of my knowledge, a
court is not at liberty to craft exceptions to statutes that are
not at issue in a case.
II A
To reject the Court's construction of the diversity statute is
not, however, necessarily to reject the federal courts' long-
7 If, in
Barber, the Court might have been said plausibly
to have relied on limitations of the English chancery courts with
respect to divorce and alimony, it seems highly unlikely that the
Court in
Burrus might have relied on a similar justification
for child custody matters. The Court in
Burrus attached as
an appendix to its opinion, 136 U. S., at 597, a "very instructive"
and "a very careful and a very able opinion,"
In the Matter of
Barry, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York. See
In re Burrus, 136 U. S.,
at 594. That opinion stated that child custody matters "res[t]
solely in England on the common law" and that such determinations
"devolved upon the high courts of equity and law."
Id., at
609. See also
Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's
Services Agency, 458 U. S. 502, 524 (1982)
(dissenting opinion) ("Historically, the English common-law courts
permitted parents to use the habeas writ to obtain custody of a
child as a way of vindicating their own rights").
714
BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment
standing practice of declining to hear certain domestic
relations cases. My point today is that no coherent
"jurisdictional" explanation for this practice emerges from our
line of such cases, and it is unreasonable to presume that Congress
divined and accepted one from these cases. To be sure, this Court's
old line of domestic relations cases disclaimed "jurisdiction" over
domestic relations matters well before the growth and general
acceptance in recent decades of modern doctrines of federal
abstention that distinguish the refusal to exercise jurisdiction
from disclaiming jurisdiction altogether. See generally C. Wright,
Federal Courts 302-330 (1983) (discussing growth of traditional
abstention doctrines). See also
Francis v.
Henderson,
425 U. S. 536,
538-539 (1976) (recognizing abstention in the context of the habeas
corpus statute where "considerations of comity and concerns for the
orderly administration of criminal justice require"). Nevertheless,
the common concern reflected in these earlier cases is, in modern
terms, abstentional-and not jurisdictional-in nature. These cases
are premised not upon a concern for the historical limitation of
equity jurisdiction of the English courts, but upon the virtually
exclusive primacy at that time of the States in the regulation of
domestic relations. As noted above, in
Simms and
De la
Rama, this Court justified its exercise of jurisdiction over
actions for divorce and alimony not by any reference to the scope
of equity jurisdiction but by reference to the absence of any
interest of the States in appeals from courts in territories
controlled by the N ational Government. Similarly, in cases wholly
outside the "common law or equity" limitation of the diversity
statute, the Court has denied federal court review.
Ohio ex rel.
Popovici v.
Agler, 280 U. S. 379 (1930)
(consuls and vice-consuls statutes);
In re Burrus, supra
(habeas corpus). As the Court once stated: "The whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States."
Id., at 593-594.
715
Whether the interest of States remains a sufficient
justification today for abstention is uncertain in view of the
expansion in recent years of federal law in the domestic relations
area.8 I am confident, nonetheless, that the unbroken and
unchallenged practice of the federal courts since before the War
Between the States of declining to hear certain domestic relations
cases provides the very rare justification for continuing to do so.
It is not without significance, moreover, that, because of this
historical practice of the federal courts, the States have
developed specialized courts and institutions in family matters,
while Congress and the federal courts generally have not done so.
Absent a contrary command of Congress, the federal courts properly
should abstain, at least from diversity actions traditionally
excluded from the federal courts, such as those seeking divorce,
alimony, and child custody.
The Court is correct that abstention "rarely should be invoked."
Ante, at 705. But rarer still-and by far the greater affront
to Congress-should be the occasions when this Court invents
statutory exceptions that are simply not there. It is one thing for
this Court to defer to more than a century of practice unquestioned
by Congress. It is quite
8 See,
e. g., Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990,
104 Stat. 4792, 42 U. S. C. § 13001
et seq.; Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act, 98 Stat. 1757, 42 U. S. C. § 10401
et seq.; Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 94 Stat.
3568, 28 U. S. C. § 1738A; Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 500-521, 42 U. S. C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a;
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of
1978, 92 Stat. 208211, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5111-5115; Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 88 Stat. 4, 42 U. S. C. § 5101
et
seq.
Like the diversity statute, the federal-question grant of
jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial
power in federal-question cases to "Cases, in Law and Equity." Art.
III, § 2. Assuming this limitation applies with equal force in the
constitutional context as the Court finds today that it does in the
statutory context, the Court's decision today casts grave doubts
upon Congress' ability to confer federal-question jurisdiction (as
under 28 U. S. C. § 1331) on the federal courts in any matters
involving divorces, alimony, and child custody.
716
BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment
another to defer on a pretext that Congress legislated what in
fact it never did. Although there is no occasion to resolve the
issue in definitive fashion in this case, I would suggest that
principles of abstention provide a more principled basis for the
Court's continued disinclination to entertain domestic relations
matters.9
B
Whether or not the domestic relations "exception" is properly
grounded in principles of abstention or principles of jurisdiction,
I do not believe this case falls within the exception. This case
only peripherally involves the subject of "domestic relations."
"Domestic relations" actions are loosely classifiable into four
categories. The first, or "core," category involves declarations of
status,
e. g., marriage, annulment, divorce, custody,
and paternity. The second, or "semicore," category involves
declarations of rights or obligations arising from status (or
former status),
e. g., alimony, child support, and
division of property. The third category consists of secondary
suits to enforce declarations of status, rights, or obligations.
The final, catchall category covers the suits not directly
involving status or obligations arising from status but that
nonetheless generally relate to domestic relations matters,
e. g., tort suits between family or former family
members for sexual abuse, battering, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. None of this Court's prior cases that consider
the domestic relations "exception" involves the type of periphery
domestic relations claim at issue here.
9 As this Court has previously observed that the various types
of abstention are not "rigid pigeonholes,"
Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco Inc., 481
U. S. 1, 11, n. 9 (1987);
New Orleans Public Service,
Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 359
(1989), there is no need to affix a label to the abstention
principles I suggest. Nevertheless, I fully agree with the Court
that
Younger abstention is inappropriate on the facts before
us, because of the absence of any pending state proceeding.
717
Petitioner does not seek a determination of status or
obligations arising from status. Moreover, any federal court
determination of petitioner's claims will neither upset a prior
state court determination of status or obligations appurtenant to
status nor pre-empt a pending state court determination of this
nature. Cf.
Moore v.
Sims, 442 U. S. 415 (1979)
(applying
Younger abstention doctrine to prevent federal
court action seeking to enjoin pending state child custody
proceeding brought by state authorities). While petitioner's claims
do not involve a federal question or statute-the presence of which
would strongly counsel against abstention, see
Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800, 815, n. 21
(1976)-petitioner's state-law tort claims for money damages are
easily cognizable in a federal court. All these considerations
favor the exercise of federal jurisdiction over petitioner's
claims.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in
the judgment.
This should be an exceedingly easy case. * As demonstrated by
each of the opinions, whatever belief one holds as to the
existence, origin, or scope of a "domestic relations exception,"
the exception does not apply here. However one understands
18th-century English chancery practice and however one construes
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the result is the same. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals must be
*The first Justice Harlan cautioned long ago that" 'it is the
duty of all courts of justice to take care, for the general good of
the community, that hard cases do not make bad law.'''
United
States v.
Clark, 96 U. S. 37, 49 (1878)
(dissenting opinion) (quoting
East India Co. v.
Paul,
7 Moo. 85, 111, 13 Eng. Rep. 811, 821 (P. C. 1849)). Courts should
observe similar caution with regard to easy cases. Cf.
O'Bannon v.
Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773,804 (1980)
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment) ("[E]asy cases make bad
law");
Burnham v.
Superior Court of Cal., County of
Marin, 495 U. S.
604, 640 (1990) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). An easy
case is especially likely to make bad law when it is unnecessarily
transformed into a hard case.
718
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
reversed. For that reason, I would leave for another day
consideration of whether any domestic relations cases necessarily
fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of what,
if any, principle would justify such an exception to federal
jurisdiction.
As I agree that this case does not come within any domestic
relations exception that might exist, I concur in the judgment.
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