On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Opinion of Justice STEVENS respecting the denial of the petition
for writ of certiorari.
Although I believe that Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, was decided
incorrectly, it is not at all clear to me that the Court of Appeals
in this case misapplied the dicta in the Court's opinion in
Jackson. The Court of Appeals did not purport to resolve any
conflict in the evidence. Quite properly it attached no weight to
the fact that the defendant did not testify, or to the fact that
his mother may have testified falsely in support of an alibi
defense. Neither of those facts is affirmative evidence of
guilt.
Based on their duty to "review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution,"
662 F.2d
420, 423 (CA6 1981), a majority of the judges of the Court of
Appeals concluded-as had the District Court and two of five
justices of the Michigan Supreme Court-that there was insufficient
evidence in the record that the respondent had intended to commit a
crime. It is quite misleading to describe the slim record in this
case as "a classic case of conflicting evidence,"
Page 455 U.S.
1028 , 1029
post, at 1031, or to imply that these conscientious federal
judges chose " to sit as a jury and set aside the lawful jury's
findings of fact." Post, at 1033. What the Court of Appeals did
conclude was that evidence that the respondent, like several other
boys, was present at the scene of the crime was legally
insufficient to permit any rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that respondent was a participant in that crime.
See 662 F.2d, at 423. The essence of the Court of Appeals decision
is explained in the following few paragraphs:
"The district court correctly concluded that the evidence
introduced at petitioner's trial only showed that on the morning of
May 18 Fuller was present at the Turner residence along with
Zerious Meadows and the other boys. The evidence showed that Fuller
looked around while Meadows started the fires. But as Judge Feikens
pointed out:
" 'This suggests, as Jeffrey Coleman surmised, that the
petitioner may have been acting as a lookout for Meadows. It is
reasonable speculation. But could a rational jury find it to be
proof beyond a reasonable doubt? No evidence was presented that the
petitioner intended to burn the Turner home. The evidence that he
knew that Zerious Meadows planned to do [sic] is simply too meager
to support conviction.' (emphasis in original)
"We note that there was no evidence at trial that the 'Molotov
cocktail' which started the fire was prepared in advance, or, if it
was, whether any of the boys other than Zerious Meadows knew that
the 'Molotov cocktail' existed. There was of course no evidence
that any of the boys, except Fuller [sic], participated in the
manufacture of the 'Molotov cocktail'.
"Moreover, there was no direct evidence that the youths
approached the Turner house with intent to set the house on fire.
Assuming Zerious Meadows had this
Page 455 U.S.
1028 , 1030
intent, however, there was no evidence that it was shared by
petitioner or the other boys.
"The only direct evidence supporting the State's contention that
Fuller 'stood guard and acted as a lookout' for Zerious Meadows was
Jeffrey Coleman's testimony that over a period of several minutes
Fuller turned his head from side to side 'more than twice.' We
agree with the district court that this is insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuller took conscious
action to aid Meadows' commission of arson." Id., at 424.
In my judgment it would not be an appropriate use of this
Court's scarce resources to grant certiorari and review every
record in which a federal court makes a conscientious effort to
apply the dictates of Jackson v. Virginia. For that reason, without
reaching the question whether I would have decided this case the
same way the Court of Appeals did had I been a member of that
court, I think this Court wisely denies certiorari.
Chief Justice BURGER, with whom Justice O'CONNOR joins,
dissenting.
Respondent Fuller was convicted of felony murder in 1970,
following a fire in which two children died. The fire occurred on
the morning of May 18, 1970. The prosecution's evidence showed that
Fuller served as a lookout while Meadows set the fire. Fuller was
17 years old at the time. A neighbor testified that she saw Fuller,
along with a few other boys, standing in front of the Turner house
on the morning of the fire. A 14- year-old, Coleman, testified that
he saw Fuller and Meadows behind the house. Meadows was on the back
porch. As Coleman watched, for 5 or 10 minutes, Meadows stuffed a
rag inside a bottle, ignited the rag, and threw the bottle against
the house, starting a fire. Meadows then set another fire. Fuller,
meanwhile, stood by a gate leading from the backyard to an alley.
Coleman testified that Fuller looked up and down the alley while
Meadows was setting the fires. Fuller and Meadows then left the
yard
Page 455 U.S.
1028 , 1031
through the gate and ran down the alley together. Coleman went
to the house of a friend, Martin, and reported that the Turner
house was on fire.
The defense moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the
close of the State's evidence. The trial judge ruled that the
evidence against Fuller established a prima facie case and denied
the motion.
The defense put on one witness, Fuller's mother. She testified
that Fuller was at home asleep until 9:00 o'clock on the morning of
the fire; therefore, he could not have been involved in setting the
fires. The defense case was based solely on this alibi and an
attempt to discredit Coleman's testimony. Defense counsel told the
jury that the only real issue in the case was whether Fuller or
someone else was standing behind the Turner house.
There was no challenge to the trial judge's instructions on
reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence. This, then, was
a classic case of conflicting evidence in which the jury had to
pass on the credibility of the witnesses. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty. The verdict shows the jury did not believe
Fuller's mother and accept his alibi defense. The jury obviously
accepted as true the testimony of Coleman and the testimony of two
other witnesses who said that they saw Fuller at the scene on the
morning of the fire. The trial judge denied a motion for a new
trial, and Fuller received a mandatory life sentence as an
accessory to murder by arson. Meadows was convicted of first-degree
murder in a separate trial.
Fuller appealed directly to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
unanimously affirmed the conviction. People v. Fuller, 44 Mich.App.
297, 205 N.W.2d 287 (1973). It held that the evidence was
sufficient to convict Fuller because, if the jury believed Coleman,
it could reasonably conclude that Fuller acted as a lookout for
Meadows. A divided Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. 395 Mich. 451,
236 N.W.2d 58
(1975). It also noted that evidence was presented, which, if
believed by the jury, showed that Fuller acted as a lookout.
Page 455 U.S.
1028 , 1032
In another in a series of cases in which federal courts retry
issues of fact and credibility, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan granted Fuller's application for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court purported to apply
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). It
noted that Jackson held that habeas relief could only be granted if
"no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id., at 324. The District Court then reviewed
and reweighed the evidence presented at trial and concluded that
the evidence which persuaded 12 jurors, who heard all the evidence
and observed the demeanor of all the witnesses, was too meager to
support the prosecution's contention that Fuller acted as a
lookout. The District Court relied heavily on the fact that no
evidence was presented to show Fuller knew that Meadows planned to
burn the Turner home; Fuller, of course, did not take the
stand.
A divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
662 F.2d
420 (1981). That court again reweighed the evidence which 12
jurors found sufficient under instructions not questioned. Like the
District Court, two of the members of the panel concluded that
there was insufficient evidence presented to establish that Fuller
knew Meadows intended to commit arson.
Dissenting, Judge Weick cogently contended that the federal
courts were improperly usurping the function of the state-court
jury. If the jury which saw and heard the witnesses chose to
believe Coleman's testimony, it was reasonable to infer that Fuller
acted as a lookout for Meadows. The jury clearly chose to believe
Coleman, just as it chose to disbelieve Fuller's alibi.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied
Jackson. There we held that "the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reas-
Page 455 U.S.
1028 , 1033
onable doubt." 443 U.S., at 319. It is sheer nonsense to suggest
that, on this record, the 12 jurors acted irrationally. With all
respect, I suggest that the District Court and the Court of
Appeals' majority forgot that it is the function of the jury to
determine who is telling the truth. Judges betray their function
when they arrogate themselves over the legal factfinder. Either we
accept the jury system with the risk of human fallibility or we
ought to change the structure of the system and redefine the
standard of review under the habeas corpus statutes. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals did not view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, as the law and their oaths
require. If they had, they could not have rationally concluded that
the jury could not reasonably reach the result it reached. Instead,
the courts reweighed Coleman's testimony, noting that he was young,
that he had been placed in a youth house because he ran away from
home, and that he attended a "special school." Put simply-and
bluntly, as this case demands-the federal judges who set aside this
state-court judgment acted like jurors, not jurists.
This Court cannot sit as a court of errors to correct every
mistake by other courts. But the decision here warrants
consideration by this Court because the courts have misapplied
Jackson in a way that threatens to lead to reversals of state-court
criminal convictions whenever a federal court chooses to sit as a
jury and set aside the lawful jury's findings of fact. There was a
flagrant refusal here to review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, as the law commands. Jackson did not
authorize such gross interference with the functioning of state
criminal justice systems.
I would grant certiorari and reverse the decision below, with
appropriate reminders to my colleagues as to certain fundamental
propositions concerning their role. Our heavy docket is an
insufficient reason to allow this erroneous judgment to stand.
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