OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET
AL.
v.
EDWARDS, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR EDWARDS, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 93-1883. Argued January 18, 1995-Decided March 22,1995
The federal "family filing unit rule," 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38),
requires that all cohabiting nuclear family members be grouped into
a single "assistance unit" (AU) for purposes of eligibility and
benefits determinations under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. California's "non-sibling filing unit
rule" (California Rule) additionally groups into a single AU all
needy children who live in the same household, whether or not they
are siblings, if there is only one adult caring for them. When
application of the California Rule resulted in decreases in the
maximum per capita AFDC benefits due respondents, who include Verna
Edwards and her cohabiting dependent minor granddaughter and two
grandnieces, they brought this action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against petitioners, the state officials charged
with administering California's AFDC program, claiming that the
California Rule violates federal law. The District Court granted
summary judgment for respondents, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: Federal law does not prohibit California from
grouping into a single AU all needy children living in the same
household under the care of one relative. Pp. 149-158.
(a) The California Rule does not violate 45 CFR §
233.20(a)(2)(viii), an AFDC regulation prohibiting States from
reducing the amount of assistance "solely because of the presence
in the household of a nonlegally responsible individual."
Respondents are simply wrong when they contend that,
e.
g., it was
solely the arrival in Mrs. Edwards' home
of her grandnieces that triggered a decline in the per capita
benefits that previously were paid to her granddaughter; rather, it
was the grandnieces' presence
plus their application for
AFDC assistance through Mrs. Edwards. Had the grandnieces, after
coming to live with Mrs. Edwards, either not applied for assistance
or applied through a different caretaker relative living in the
home, the California Rule would not have affected the
granddaughter's benefits at all. P. 151.
144
Syllabus
(b) Nor does the California Rule violate 45 CFR §§
233.20(a)(2)(viii), 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), and 233.90(a)(1), which
prohibit States from assuming that a cohabitant's income is
available to a needy child absent a casespecific determination that
it is actually or legally available. First, the California Rule
does not necessarily reduce the benefits of all needy children when
one of them receives outside income, for California may rationally
assume that the caretaker will observe her duties to all of the
AU's members and will take into account the receipt of any such
income by one child when expending funds on behalf of the AU.
Second, the California Rule simply authorizes the combination of
incomes of all AU members in order to determine the amount of the
AU's assistance payment. This accords with the very definition of
an AU as the group of individuals whose income and resources are
considered "as a unit" in determining the amount of benefits, 45
CFR § 206.10(b)(5), and is authorized by the AFDC statute itself,
42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(A), which provides that a state agency
"shall, in determining need, take into consideration any ... income
and resources of any child or relative claiming [AFDC assistance]."
In light of the great latitude that States have in administering
their AFDC programs, see,
e. g., Dandridge v.
Williams, 397
U. S. 471, 478, that statute is reasonably construed to allow
States, in determining a child's need (and therefore the amount of
her assistance), to consider the income and resources of all
cohabiting children and relatives also claiming assistance. The
availability regulations are addressed to an entirely different
problem: attempts by States to count income and resources
controlled by persons outside the AU for the purpose of determining
the amount of the AU's assistance. See 42 Fed. Reg. 6583-6584, and,
e. g., King v.
Smith, 392 U. S. 309. The
California Rule has no such effect. pp. 152-155.
(c) Respondents' alternative arguments-(1) that the federal
family filing unit rule occupies the field and thereby pre-empts
California from adopting its Rule, and (2) that the California Rule
violates 45 CFR §§ 233.1O(a)(1) and 233.20(a)(1)(i), which require
equitable treatment among AFDC recipients-lack merit. Pp.
156-158.
12 F.3d
154, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Dennis Paul Eckhart, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the
briefs were
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General,
Charlton G.
Holland III, Assistant Attorney
General, and G.
Mateo Munoz, Deputy Attorney General.
145
Paul A. Engelmayer argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor
General Kneedler, William Kanter, and Howard S. Scher.
Katherine E. Meiss argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Alice Bussiere, Patrice E. McElroy,
Jodie Berger, and Paul Lee.
*
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether federal law governing
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
prohibits States from grouping into a single AFDC
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Minnesota et al. by
Hubert H. Humphrey III,
Attorney General of Minnesota, and
LauraSue Schlatter,
Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows:
Richard Blumenthal of
Connecticut,
Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, G.
Oliver Koppell of New York,
Michael F.
Easley
of North Carolina,
Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon,
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania,
Jeffrey B.
Pine of Rhode Island,
Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont,
Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, and
James S.
Gilmore III of Virginia; for the State of
Nevada et al. by
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of
Nevada, and
John Albrecht, Deputy Attorney General,
Bruce
M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska,
Vanesa Ruiz,
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia,
Robert A.
Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida,
Donald L.
Paillette, Acting Attorney General of Guam,
Robert A.
Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii,
Roland W Burris,
Attorney General of Illinois,
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney
General of Montana,
Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of
New Jersey,
Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma,
Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island,
Mark W
Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, and
Joseph B.
Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Council of State
Governments et al. by
Richard Ruda and
Lee Fennell;
and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by
Ronald A. Zumbrun
and
John H. Findley.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Alliance for Children's Rights et al. by
Charles N.
Freiberg and
David B. Goodwin; and for the American
Association of Retired Persons by
Steven S.
Zaleznick
and
Michael Schuster.
146
"assistance unit" all needy children who live in the same
household under the care of one relative. Such grouping allows
States to grant equal assistance to equally sized needy households,
regardless of whether the children in the household are all
siblings. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
federal law forbids States to equalize assistance in this manner.
We disagree and accordingly reverse.
I
AFDC is a joint federal-state public assistance program
authorized by Title IV -A of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627,
42 U. S. C. § 601
et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). As its
name indicates, the AFDC program "is designed to provide financial
assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives
who live with and care for them."
Shea v.
Vialpando,
416 U. S. 251,
253 (1974). The program "reimburses each State which chooses to
participate with a percentage of the funds it expends," so long as
the State "administer[s] its assistance program pursuant to a state
plan that conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations."
Heckler v.
Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985)
(citing 42 U. S. C. §§ 602, 603).
One applicable federal rule requires state plans to provide that
all members of a nuclear family who live in the same household must
apply for AFDC assistance if anyone of them applies; in addition,
the income of all of these applicants must be aggregated in
determining their eligibility and the amount of their monthly
benefits. See 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38) (1988 ed., Supp. V); 45 CFR
§ 206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1993). See generally
Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483
U. S. 587 (1987) (upholding rule against constitutional
challenges). This "family filing unit rule" requires that all
cohabiting nuclear family members be grouped into a single AFDC
"assistance unit" (AU), defined by federal law as "the group of
individuals whose income, resources and needs are considered as a
unit for purposes of determining eligibility and the amount
147
of payment." 45 CFR § 206.10(b)(5) (1993). The regulation at
issue in this case-California's "non-sibling filing unit rule"
(California Rule)-goes even further in this regard. It provides:
"Two or more AU s in the same home shall be combined into one AU
when ... [t]here is only one [adult] caretaker relative." Cal.
Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures §
82-824.1.13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 52. In other words, the
California Rule groups into a single AU all needy children who live
in the same household, whether or not they are siblings, if there
is only one adult caring for all of them.
The consolidation of two or more AU's into a single AU pursuant
to the California Rule results in a decrease in the maximum per
capita AFDC benefits for which the affected individuals are
eligible. This occurs because, while California (like many States)
increases the amount of assistance for each additional person added
to an AU, the increase is not proportional. Thus, as the number of
persons in the AU increases, the per capita payment to the AU
decreases.1
1 Between July 1, 1989, and August 31, 1991, California adhered
to the following schedule of maximum monthly AFDC payments:
Number of
persons in AU |
Maximum aid
payment |
Per capita
payment |
| 1 |
$ 341 |
$341.00 |
| 2 |
560 |
280.00 |
| 3 |
694 |
231.33 |
| 4 |
824 |
206.00 |
| 5 |
940 |
188.00 |
| 6 |
1,057 |
176.17 |
| 7 |
1,160 |
165.71 |
| 8 |
1,265 |
158.13 |
| 9 |
1,366 |
151.78 |
| 10 or more |
1,468 |
146.80 |
Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in No. CV-S 911473 (ED
Cal.), p. 7 (Feb. 13,1992). Cf.
Dandridge v.
Williams, 397
U. S. 471,488 (1970) (reproducing similar Maryland schedule.)
The current schedule is set forth in
148
See,
e. g., Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 473-474
(1970) (sustaining a Maryland AFDC regulation under which "the
standard of need increases with each additional person in the
household, but the increments become proportionately smaller").
The situation of respondent Verna Edwards and her relatives
illustrates the operation of these two rules. Initially, Mrs.
Edwards received AFDC assistance on behalf of her granddaughter,
for whom she is the sole caretaker.2 As a one-person AU, the
granddaughter was eligible to receive a "maximum aid payment" of
$341 per month prior to September 1991. See n. 1,
supra.
Later, Mrs. Edwards began caring for her two grandnieces, who are
siblings. Pursuant to the federal family filing unit rule, the
grandnieces are grouped together in a two-person AU, which was
eligible to receive $560 per month in benefits prior to September
1991. See
ibid. Because none of these children received any
outside income, Mrs. Edwards received $901 per month in AFDC
assistance on behalf of the three girls. In June 1991, however,
Mrs. Edwards received notice that pursuant to the California Rule,
her granddaughter and two grandnieces would be grouped together
into a single three-person AU, which was eligible to receive only
$694 per month. See
ibid. The California Rule thus reduced
AFDC payments to the Edwards household by $207 per month.
On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Mrs.
Edwards, her three relatives, and other respondents brought this
action against petitioners, the state officials charged with
administering California's AFDC program, in the Dis-
Cal. Welf. & lnst. Code Ann. § 11450(a)(1) (West Supp.
1994), as modified by §§ 11450.01(a), (b) and 11450.015(a).
2 Mrs. Edwards does not receive AFDC assistance for herself. As
explained in the text, the family filing unit rule requires parents
to apply for assistance along with their children. But apart from
this rule, caretaker relatives need not apply for assistance along
with the needy children for whom they care, although they may do
so.
149
trict Court for the Eastern District of California. Pursuant to
Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, respondents sought a
declaration that the California Rule violates federal law and an
injunction prohibiting petitioners from enforcing it. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted the
requested relief. It found the California Rule indistinguishable in
relevant respects from the Washington regulation invalidated in
Beaton v.
Thompson, 913 F.2d
701 (CA91990).
In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. It found the California Rule "virtually identical" to the
Washington regulation that
Beaton had held to be
"inconsistent with federal law and regulation."
Edwards v.
Healy, 12 F.3d
154, 155 (1993). Since the Court of Appeals issued its
decision, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-which
administers the AFDC program on the federal level-determined that
its own AFDC regulations "do not conflict with the State policy
option to consolidate assistance units in the same household."
Transmittal No. ACF-AT-94-6 (Mar. 16, 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert.
37. Moreover, a number of Federal Courts of Appeals and state
courts of last resort have recently issued rulings at odds with the
decision below.3 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict,
512 U. S. 1288 (1994), and we now
reverse.
II
In
Beaton, the Ninth Circuit ruled that grouping into the
same AU all needy children (both siblings and nonsiblings alike)
who live in the same household is inconsistent with three different
federal AFDC regulations, namely, 45 CFR §§ 233.20(a)(2)(viii),
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), and 233.90(a)(1)
3 See
Bray v.
Dowling, 25 F.3d
135 (CA2 1994) (New York policy), cert. pending, No.
94-5845;
Wilkes v.
Gomez, 32 F.3d
1324 (CA8 1994) (Minnesota rule), cert. pending, No.
94-6929;
MacInnes v.
Commissioner of Public Welfare,
412 Mass. 790, 593 N. E. 2d 222 (1992);
Morrell v.
Flaherty, 338 N. C. 230, 449 S. E. 2d 175 (1994).
150
(1993).4 See
Beaton, supra, at 704. Respondents rely
principally on these three regulations in their submission
here.
As we examine the regulations, we keep in mind that in AFDC
cases, "the starting point of the ... analysis must be a
recognition that ... federal law gives each State great latitude in
dispensing its available funds."
Dandridge, supra, at 478.
Accord,
Shea, 416 U. S., at 253 (States "are given broad
discretion in determining both the standard of need and the level
of benefits"). In light of this cardinal
4 Section 233.20(a)(2)(viii) provides:
"[T]he money amount of any need item included in the standard
will not be prorated or otherwise reduced solely because of the
presence in the household of a non-legally responsible individual;
and the [state] agency will not assume any contribution from such
individual for the support of the assistance unit .... "
Section 233.20(a)(3)(ii) provides in part:
"[I]n determining need and the amount of the assistance payment,
... :
"(D) Income ... and resources available for current use shall be
considered. To the extent not inconsistent with any other provision
of this chapter, income and resources are considered available both
when actually available and when the applicant or recipient has a
legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to
make such sum available for support and maintenance."
Section 233.90(a)(I) provides:
"The determination whether a child has been deprived of parental
support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or (if the
State plan includes such cases) the unemployment of his or her
parent who is the principal earner will be made only in relation to
the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the
child's stepparent who is married, under State law, to the child's
natural or [adoptive] parent and is legally obligated to support
the child under State law of general applicability which requires
stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural
or adoptive parents are required to support their children. Under
this requirement, the inclusion in the family, or the presence in
the home, of a 'substitute parent' or 'man-in-the-house' or any
individual other than one described in this paragraph is not an
acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the
availability of income by the State .... "
151
principle, we conclude that the federal regulations do not
preclude the adoption of the California Rule.
A
According to § 233.20(a)(2)(viii), States may not reduce the
amount of assistance for which AFDC applicants are eligible "solely
because of the presence in the household of a nonlegally
responsible individual." U sing the example of Mrs. Edwards and her
relatives, respondents observe that, although the granddaughter
received AFDC benefits of $341 per month before the two grandnieces
came to live in Mrs. Edwards' household, she received only
one-third of $694, or $231.33, per month after the grandnieces
arrived and the California Rule took effect. See Brief for
Respondents 6, 22. This reduction in the granddaughter's per capita
benefits occurred, according to respondents, "solely because of the
presence in the household of" the grandnieces, who are "non-legally
responsible individual[s]" in relation to the granddaughter.
Respondents are simply wrong. It was not
solely the
presence of the grandnieces that triggered the decline in per
capita benefits paid to the granddaughter; rather, it was the
grandnieces' presence
plus their application for AFDC
assistance through Mrs. Edwards. Had the two grandnieces, after
coming to live in Mrs. Edwards' home, either not applied for
assistance or applied through a different caretaker relative living
in that home, the California Rule would not have affected the
granddaughter's benefits at all.5
5 Although needy children will receive less in per capita
benefits under the California Rule, this reduction affects only
children who share a household. California is simply recognizing
the economies of scale that inhere in such living arrangements.
See,
e. g., Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 599 (1987)
(crediting" 'the common sense proposition that individuals living
with others usually have reduced per capita costs because many of
their expenses are shared'" (quoting
Termini v.
Califano, 611 F.2d
367,
370 (CA2 1979))).
152
B
Respondents also argue that the California Rule violates the
"availability" principle, which is implemented, in one form or
another, by all three federal regulations. Section 233.90(a)(1)
provides that "the inclusion in the family, or the presence in the
home, of a 'substitute parent' or 'man-in-thehouse' or any
individual other than [the child's parent] is not an acceptable
basis for ... assuming the availability of income" to a needy
child. Likewise, § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) provides that States may "not
assume any contribution from [a nonlegally responsible] individual
for the support of the assistance unit." Finally, §
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) provides generally that States shall, "in
determining need and the amount of the assistance payment," count
only "[i]ncome ... and resources available for current use"; the
regulation adds that "income and resources are considered available
both when actually available and when [legally available]."
According to respondents, the California Rule assumes that
income from relatives is contributed to, or otherwise available to,
a needy child without a determination that it is actually
available. If Mrs. Edwards' granddaughter were to begin receiving
$75 per month in outside income, for example, the AU of which she
is a part would receive $75 less in monthly AFDC benefits, and the
two grandnieces would each accordingly receive $25 less in per
capita monthly benefits. Thus, the California Rule assertedly
"assumes," in violation of all three federal regulations, that the
granddaughter will contribute $25 per month of her outside income
to each grandniece and also that such income will therefore be
available to each grandniece-without a case-specific determination
that such contribution will in fact occur.
Respondents' argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, its premise is questionable. Although in this example,
the grandnieces each will
nominally receive $25 less in per
capita monthly benefits, they will
actually receive less in
benefits only if one assumes that Mrs. Edwards will expend
153
an equal amount of AFDC assistance on each of the three
children-without regard to any other relevant circumstances, such
as whether one of them receives outside income. Not only would such
assumption fail to reflect reality, see,
e. g.,
Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 600, n. 14, it would also be
inconsistent with the duty imposed on caretakers by federal law to
spend AFDC payments "in the best interests of the child[renJ" for
whom they care, 42 U. S. C. § 605, a duty specifically implemented
by California law, see,
e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code Ann. §§ 11005.5, 11480 (West 1991). Thus, California may
rationally assume that a caretaker will observe her duties to all
the members of the AU and will take into account the receipt of any
outside income by one child when expending funds on behalf of the
AU.
Second, respondents' argument misperceives the operation of the
California Rule. In the foregoing example, California would simply
add the monthly income of all members of the AU-$75 (granddaughter)
plus $0 (first grandniece) plus $0 (second grandniece) for a total
of $75-and reduce the monthly assistance payment to the Edwards
family AU accordingly. I t should be clear from this example that
the monthly payment to the AU is reduced not because the California
Rule "assumes" that any income is available to the grandnieces, but
because it places the two grandnieces into the same AU as the
granddaughter (whose income is actually available to herself). What
respondents are really attacking is the rule that the income of all
members of the AU is combined in order to determine the amount of
the assistance payment to the AU. This attack ignores the very
definition of an AU: the group of individuals whose income and
resources are considered "as a unit" for purposes of determining
the amount of the assistance payment. 45 CFR § 206.10(b)(5) (1993).
Accord, Brief for Respondents 4 ("All of the income and resources
of everyone in the assistance unit are taken into consideration in
establishing the benefit payment").
154
Perhaps respondents are arguing that the regulations simply
forbid California to combine the incomes of all needy children in a
household-whether by grouping them into the same AU or otherwise.
But whatever are the limits that federal law imposes on States'
authority in this regard, the combination of incomes effected by
the California Rule is authorized by the AFDC statute itself, which
provides that a state agency "shall, in determining need, take into
consideration any ... income and resources of any child or relative
claiming [AFDC assistance]." 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1988 ed.
and Supp. V). In light of the "great latitude,"
Dandridge,
397 U. S., at 478, and the "broad discretion,"
Shea, 416 U.
S., at 253, that States have in administering their AFDC programs,
this statute is reasonably construed to allow States, in
determining a child's need (and therefore how much assistance she
will receive), to take into consideration the income and resources
of all cohabiting children and relatives also claiming AFDC
assistance.
The availability regulations are addressed to an entirely
different problem, namely, the counting of income and resources
controlled by persons outside the AU for the purpose of determining
the amount of assistance to be provided to the AU. The regulations
were adopted to implement our decisions in three AFDC cases. See 42
Fed. Reg. 6583-6584 (1977) (citing
King v.
Smith,
392 U. S. 309
(1968);
Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U. S. 552 (1970);
Van Lare v.
Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975)). In
all three cases, the State had counted as available to the AU
income that was not actually or legally available because it was
controlled by a person who was not a member of the AU and who was
not applying for AFDC assistance. See
King, supra, at 311 (a
"'substitute father,'" defined as any able-bodied man who cohabited
with the mother of the needy children in or outside her home);
Lewis, supra, at 554 ("an adult male person assuming the
role of spouse to the mother," such as a common-law husband, or
a
155
nonadopting stepfather not legally obligated to support the
children);
Van Lare, supra, at 339, 340 (a "nonpaying
lodge[r]," who was "a person not a recipient of AFDC"). Accord,
Bray v.
Dowling, 25 F.3d
135, 144 (CA2 1994) (the federal availability regulations "were
established to address specific concerns regarding the imputation
of income from non-AFDC sources"), cert. pending, No. 94-5845.
The California Rule has no such effect. The combined income of
the three-person AU comprising the granddaughter and two
grandnieces of Mrs. Edwards is not calculated with reference to the
income either of Mrs. Edwards herself or of anyone else inside or
outside the Edwards household who is not a member of the AU and who
is not applying for AFDC assistance. In sum, the California Rule
does not violate any of the three federal regulations on which the
Court of Appeals relied.6
6We are aware that in certain situations in which a member of a
consolidated AU begins to receive outside income (such as monthly
child support payments, an inheritance, or even lottery winnings),
the household would receive a larger AFDC monthly payment if the
recipient (along with all members of her nuclear family, as
required by the federal family filing unit rule) terminated her
participation in the AFDC program. See,
e. g.,
Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 591 (citing example from prior to
federal rule's adoption). Were California law to forbid a person to
"opt out" of the AFDC program in these situations, it might be said
that the State had reduced AFDC assistance to the AU's remaining
members based solely on the presence or the income of a person who
is not applying for such assistance.
We find it unnecessary to determine whether California law ever
forbids a person who begins receiving outside income to opt out of
the AFDC program. Certainly, nothing in the California Rule itself
speaks to this issue. Furthermore, because respondents challenged
the California Rule on its face by seeking to enjoin its
enforcement altogether, see First Amended Complaint in No. CV-S 91
1473 (ED Cal.), pp. 16-17 (Jan. 10, 1992), they could not sustain
their burden even if they showed that a possible application of the
rule (in concert with another statute or regulation) violated
federal law. See
United States v.
Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987)
(a facial challenge is "the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances ex-
156
III
Respondents offer two alternative grounds to support the
judgment below. Neither has merit, and we may dispose of them
quickly.
First, respondents argue that the California Rule is an invalid
expansion of the family filing unit rule, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38).
According to respondents, when Congress decreed that all members of
a nuclear family must be grouped together in a single AU, it
intended to prevent States from including any additional persons in
that AU (as does the California Rule). We reject the notion that
Congress' directive regarding the composition of assistance units
"occupied the field" and thereby pre-empted States from adopting
any additional rules touching this area. What we said about
"workfare" in
New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413
U. S. 405, 414 (1973), applies here as well: "If Congress had
intended to pre-empt state plans and efforts in such an important
dimension of the AFDC program ... , such intentions would in all
likelihood have been expressed in direct and unambiguous language."
The language of § 602(a)(38) requires States to embrace the family
filing unit rule; it does not further limit States' discretion in a
direct or unambiguous manner.
Second, respondents argue that the California Rule violates two
other federal regulations that require equitable treatment among
AFDC recipients. See 45 CFR § 233.10(a)(1) (1993) ("[T]he
eligibility conditions imposed ... must not result in inequitable
treatment of individuals or groups"); § 233.20(a)(1)(i) ("[T]he
determination of need and amount of assistance for all applicants
[must] be made on an objective and equitable basis"). Assuming that
these provisions even "creat[e] a 'federal right' that is
enforceable under
ists under which the [rule] would be valid"). Though an
as-applied challenge that presented the opt-out issue in a concrete
factual setting might require a court to decide it, such a
challenge is not now before us.
157
[42 U. S. C.] § 1983,"
Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital
Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990), we find that the California
Rule affirmatively fosters equitable treatment among AFDC
recipients.
For example, prior to September 1991 a caretaker relative
responsible for three brothers having no outside income would have
received AFDC benefits of $694 per month on their behalf. Yet
before the California Rule was applied to her household, Mrs.
Edwards received monthly benefits of $901 for the three girls for
whom she cared. See
supra, at 148. The $207 difference is
due solely to the fact that in one household all of the children
are siblings, while in the other they are not. The potential
inequities in the absence of the California Rule are even greater.
Six needy siblings living in the same household in California could
have received up to $1,057 per month in benefits before September
1991. But prior to the California Rule's adoption, six needy
nonsiblings who lived in the same household could have received as
much as $2,046, or almost double. See n. 1,
supra. The
California Rule sensibly and equitably eliminates these disparities
by providing that equally sized and equally needy households will
receive equal AFDC assistance. Thus, the rule does not violate the
equitable treatment regulations.7
7 In its 1994 Transmittal, see
supra, at 149, HHS
examined all of the federal AFDC rules at issue in this case-the
three availability regulations, the statutory family filing unit
rule, and the equitable treatment regulations. The agency
concluded: "Apart from complying with [the family filing unit rule
and a related rule], States are authorized to set the State-wide
policy, to be applied in all cases, whether and under what
conditions two or more assistance units in the same household are
to be consolidated or retained as separate units." App. to Pet. for
Cert. 35. Because we have independently reached the same
conclusion, we have no occasion to decide whether we must defer to
the agency's position. Cf.
Martin v.
Occupational Safety
and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 150 (1991)
("It is well established 'that an agency's construction of its own
regulations is entitled to substantial deference'" (quoting
Lyng v.
Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939
(1986))).
158
***
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the California Rule
does not violate federal law. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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